TELEVISION

January 1968
Volume XXV
Number 1
One Dollar

SPOT

THE BROADCASTERS' PROBLEM: HOW TO GET SPOT OFF ITS BIG, FAT PLATEAU



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Market	Station	Time	Rating	Share	Viewers
Detroit	WJBK-TV	7:00 pm	18	33	542,000 (Nov '67)
New Orleans	WWL-TV	noon	12	43	101,000 (June '67)
Peoria	WIRL-TV	6:00 pm	20	37	80,000 (Nov '67)
Cleveland	WJW-TV	7:00 pm	18	39	416,000 (Nov '67)

All above stations strip T or C Monday through Friday!



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This two-hour weekly talk-show is, above all, entertaining. Now in 23 markets. 52 two-hour programs with no reruns. First run, in color, on videotape.

Market	Station	Time	Day	Rating	Share	Households
New York	WNEW-TV	11:00 pm	Sat	5	14	278,000 (Oct '67)
St. Louis	KPLR-TV	9:00 pm	Sun	3	5	22,000 (Nov '67)
Indianapolis	WTTV	10:00 pm	Sun	2	6	17,000 (Nov '67)



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Market	Station	Time	Day	Rating	Share	Households
Seattle/Tacoma	KOMO-TV	5:30 pm	M-F	11	28	71,000 (Oct '67)
Washington	WTTG	6:30 pm	M-F	10	23	137,000 (Oct '67)
Los Angeles	KTTV	5:00 pm	Sat	5	20	140,000 (Oct '67)

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DEPARTMENTS

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

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

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TELEVISION ON LOCATION

Miami Beach: TV code to continue counting spots.

Chicago: Where does TV find new revenue?

Hollywood: Are movies good or bad for TV?

New York: the rising tide of inside TV jokes.

London: Will devaluation help British TV sales?

MIAMI BEACH:

The television code writers of the National Association of Broadcasters, who made a feint at a new tangent last fall, have found that forces, exerted in opposite directions, will turn them in circles. Quite obedient to natural law, they find themselves almost at the point where they started when alterations were recommended last spring. And they may go right on turning, season by season.

Simplifying the code is a complicated affair. Last month's code board meeting in Miami Beach proves it.

The code authority of the NAB likes to think of its commercial strictures as a votive offering of the broadcasting industry to the public interest. Indeed the language that leads its section on television time standards for nonprogram material is nothing short of a declaration of virtue, modified by only a touch of commercial reality. It says: "In order that the time for nonprogram material and its placement shall best serve the viewer, the following standards are set forth in accordance with sound television practice."

Despite protestations to the contrary, the code can be better understood these days as an instrument of commercial policy than as a testament of good will toward man. The doctoring of the code in the past year, after all, has not been by the National Citizens Committee for Public Television, but by nine commercial broadcasters whose work is subject to review by a team of senior surgeons known as the association's TV board.

The original purpose of the treatment was presumably to give the broadcaster more freedom in the way he sold his time and to free the NAB from the odious chore of defining and counting commercials. So the TV board last fall approved new language that was to become effective next September. This set a limit of 10 minutes of nonprogram material in each prime-time hour and said that half-hour programs in prime time couldn't be interrupted more than twice with that material and that hour-length programs could be interrupted no more than four times. Dropped at that session were the limits on numbers of consecutive commercials that had been set at three during programs and two during station breaks. For non-prime time the new rule allowed no more than 16 minutes of non-program material in any hour, to consist of no more than four interruptions in any half-hour period.

The simplified version of the TV code was doomed, and, to be brutally commercial, it was doomed because it seemed about to lower the bar for any number of half-minute commercials (maybe even 15-second announcements) and who knows what kind of rampant commercial clutter. With no check on the number of commercials, any division might be possible within the new boundaries of total time and program interruptions. The change would delete the wordy criteria for judging the unit integrity of announcements that deal with more than one product, the piggyback clauses.

Stations have never taken kindly to 30-second product plugs whether they appeared as integrated halves of a one-minute sale or as unrelated (piggybacked) portions of the same unit. Taking television's time off the minute standard would be somewhat traumatic for stations, something like taking their currency off a metal standard and devaluing it in one fell swoop, perhaps a devaluation plan gone wrong. The station has seen it as a debasement of the rate card (sponsors getting more for less) and as an invitation to further foreign (network) competition.

But television *is* slowly coming off the minute standard and what happened to the code in Miami last month can be partially understood as an attempt to slow down the process. It has gone full circle and then some. The new program interruption standards were retained, and reinstated were limits on consecutive numbers of commercials. But now instead of three consecutive announcements allowed during programs, there may be four, and instead of two in station breaks, there may be three.

So back again is the problem of deciding whether a commercial is a piggyback. The code board simplified the definition of this little package of double trouble, but that's no guarantee it will be easier to recognize one. The language seemed more permissive toward multiple-product announcements. Whether it is in fact is questionable.

Previously products had to be related, and the commercial had to be constructed so that it could not be divided into two or more separate announcements. So we are left wondering whether appearance as a "single unit" required in the new language, encompasses the indivisibility demanded in the old.

The networks indicated they could live with the new proposals, but at least one has made it clear that it favored no consecutive-announcement restrictions. Presumably all the networks want guaranteed elbow room in the emerging era of the 30-second commercial. CBS-TV threatened to pick up its marbles and leave the code game if the rules threatened freedom of the marketplace.

A CBS-TV official said, if followed, the suggested rules would prevent plans the network has for experimenting with clustered commercials. He said he had two specific programs in mind where announcements would be bunched together to minimize damage to dramatic continuity. At least one of these would involve participating sponsorship and possible use of piggyback commercials. It ought to be mentioned that networks have found most moves toward more flexible sales practices to their advantage in the competition with stations for national advertising. And national spot TV has never been more acutely aware of its relation to network sales practices (see page 23). It should also be remembered that the Federal Trade Commission is formally investigating network sales practices with a view to equal treatment for all potential sponsors. That might mean letting all have access to 30-second purchases. A federal fillip could hasten the coming of the half-minute form.

Although networks are in voting minority on the code board, their participation in the code is essential to its meaningful existence. Defection by one or more of them could leave whole blocks of television time uncovered by the code. But there is no reason to suppose that the rules in their latest incarnation will have extraordinary sex appeal for the TV board, which meets to consider them this month. In fact one member of that group—a station man—confides he doesn't give them much chance of passing. He thinks "the code has gone everywhere and done nothing."

JOHN GARDINER

CHICAGO:
Where does television, the universal advertising medium, find new advertising revenue?

One way is to chip it off the part of an advertiser's budget that is allocated to other media. But how much is there left to chip away these days?

Another source may be in helping the established advertiser achieve his utmost sales potential. TV gets its share of the bigger budget that results.

But this is the traditional digging for the long haul. And a lot of other media salesmen are holding shovels of their own.

The Chicago team of the Television Bureau of Advertising, Jacob Evans and Mike Schwimmer, while still chipping and digging in the usual places, figured another way for TV to find its new gold might be to make it. As any good advertising alchemist knows, the formula is simple: Take alert and aggressive people, help them get started in new businesses and help them grow.

So where do you find the raw materials to make the formula work? Evans and Schwimmer learned that good strikes might be made in a fast-developing territory known as franchising.

The International Franchise Association, which makes its headquarters in Chicago, claims that franchising is the fastest growing segment of the private-enterprise economy today. Some 30,000 new local franchise businesses start each year. The claimed success rate is high, 90%.

For the past two years Evans and Schwimmer have been addressing franchise conventions and making presentations. With the help of some broadcasters and advertisers the team put on a panel at the national workshop of the IFA held at the University of Chicago. Helping TVB make this key pitch were James Ebel, KOLN-TV Lincoln, Neb.; Brad Eidmann, WGN Continental Productions, Chicago; Bill Oberholtzer, Leo Burnett Co., Chicago, and Louis Schnuth, marketing manager, McDonald's System Inc., Chicago.

McDonald's is one of the new breed of franchise hamburger chains. In 1961 this breed collectively spent only $54,000 in all of TV. Today one group alone will spend many times that much in a single market. Last year (1967) in the first half alone the available national-spot figures indicate the hamburger chains spent $1.7 million. The top trio were Burger King, Burger Chef and McDonald's.

McDonald's by itself in the first half of 1967 spent nearly $1.4 million in network TV. No figures are yet available for the local TV spending by the hamburger chains, but they are considered substantial. A single group's local buying could well top the million-dollar mark based on today's trends.

Television even figures in the issuance of franchises. Burger Chef, which is based in Indianapolis, uses television station coverage maps to help plot locations to open.

But food isn't the only franchise ware that TV is selling briskly these days. Aamco Transmissions, a franchise repair business that Zsa Zsa Gabor seems to know something about, reports that television is its darling and did more to promote new franchises in the Los Angeles area than any other medium. Aamco's spot-TV billing is still shooting up.

Evans and Schwimmer found five different methods used by franchise groups to organize their resources for television advertising. Mary Carter Paint Co., Tampa, Fla., for example, uses the 50-50 co-op concept. Carter puts up one-half the money to match the TV dollars of the local franchisees. The franchiser also provides free commercials to the groups. Carter is using TV in more than a hundred markets now.

Dairy Queen, based in St. Louis, places the group's network television, and the local franchise groups place the local TV. Burger King handles all advertising out of Miami, feeling this gives that group greater flexibility to attack problem markets or develop new markets.

Chicken Delight of Rock Island, Ill., however, places television for the first year, and after that the buying of TV is delegated to the local franchise group. The assumption is that by that time the local firms have learned how to use TV properly. Once a given market area has about 20 units the TV formula goes into effect.

Last is the McDonald's method, a variation used by other firms too. It involves the purchase of some national TV by the parent company. The primary TV buying, though, comes from the franchisees through local co-op groups, but with home office help. McDonald's prefers that the local groups use the McDonald's produced commercials, and it supplies a total package of media mix materials just as the company supplies other materials and services.

Lately the TVB crew has been busy digging at sales meetings of Robo-Wash Inc., Kansas City, Mo., franchiser of 50-cent automatic car washing units. Robo-Wash now has 600 sites operating and intends to use TV. It already is using the medium in its home town.

If Robo-Wash can make money out of road grime, so can television.

LAWRENCE CHRISTOPHER

HOLLYWOOD:
Are feature films good or bad for television? It has to be the most profound industry question today in Hollywood. From it spring the collateral questions of whether the features will contribute to the employment or unemployment of television workers and what effect they may have on other program forms. Not since video tape challenged film's dominance has the television industry in Hollywood agonized more over a trend.

The Hollywood chapter of the National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences staged a long-winded dialogue about the subject of movies for television one surprisingly savage wintry night last month in NBC-TV's Studio 4 in Burbank. Some 200 academy members, wearing ski sweaters, quilted jack-

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ON LOCATION

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ets, topcoats—some hugging hot beverage containers in two hands like a northern road gang on a coffee break—gathered to mostly applaud those standing against television's increasing demand for movies and to sit in silent disapproval of those who would ride with the trend.

The lineup for the evening showed network executives Harve Bennett, Herb Schlosser and Perry Lafferty joining film studio vice president Grant Tinker and film producer Leonard Freeman in advocating and defending the use of feature films for television. They were debated by producers Sam Denoff and Sy Gomberg, publicist Dan Jenkins, advertising agency executive William D. Gargan Jr. and actor Charlton Heston. Moderator for the event was Walter E. Grauman, producer of 20th Century-Fox TV's *The Felony Squad.*

Leading off with the opening statement for his side was Charlton Heston, who also was representing the Screen Actors Guild, of which he's president. Heston said his position personally was simple. "I am totally opposed to the release of theatrical films on television," he said, "because of the irresponsible editing and the necessary, unavoidable interruption of commercials that attend them and the creative effect of even the finest film of George Stevens, David Lean or Will Wyler is diminished markedly by such an exposure. I would prefer that my films were not on television."

Speaking for the 18,000 members of the Screen Actors Guild, Mr. Heston explained that the actors he represents also would prefer that theatrical films would not be released to television because "being more expensive and more prestigiously mounted offerings they almost invariably succeed in capturing the television audience from the shows made directly for television and thus remove from the marketplace a chance for our members to work."

In the opening statement for his side, Herb Schlosser, vice president, programs, NBC-TV West Coast, said that the long-term effect of features on television would be to increase the quality of the programing that goes on the air and also increase the standard of programing that the networks will have "to shoot at" for their regular programing. "I don't think there's any question," he began, "that features on television have genuinely upgraded the nature of the audience we have, appealing to better educated, upper-income homes, people who really are interested in making television a better medium."

Beyond that, he said that the climate features have created has given rise to the possibility of good original drama being produced more regularly for television. "We think that features as well as the two-hour programs we're producing to go on television first are creating an appetite and demand for better dramatic programing," he concluded.

The discussion was then opened to the rest of the panel and Sy Gomberg, producer of *Accidental Family,* which Schlosser's network had cancelled early in the season, jumped in. "It's a sad commentary," he said, that so much of prime time on television today "is dependent on something made years ago."

Perry Lafferty, vice president, programs, CBS-TV Hollywood, maintained that features were on television to stay because the audience likes them and because they're effective. He suggested that the panel would better address itself to how the industry can deal with "what is here and what will be here for many years to come."

Heston, again speaking for SAG, immediately told of one specific, pragmatic action the guild is taking to deal with what it feels is an "economic threat" to the livelihood of its members. "We intend, with each successive contract that expires," he said, "to make it increasingly more expensive to exhibit theatrical movies on television with the aim to make it no longer economically competitive."

Sam Denoff, writer-producer of *Good Morning, World* on CBS-TV, and who spent most of the evening baiting Perry Lafferty, the network's representative on the panel, claimed that the training ground of television is going to be lost because there will be less original programing, less chance for new writers to learn and that television as an art form will lose its great opportunity to develop as a result of the flood of movies on the networks.

William D. Gargan Jr., vice president, TV programs, Doyle Dane Bernbach Inc., Los Angeles, agreeing with Denoff, also asked: "What's happened to this art form? Where is this great thing we had years ago?" Saying that he was convinced there's an "osmosis" to seven nights a week of features on televison, he

You're an independent station in Washington, D.C. How do you deliver more women and more homes during prime time than your network competition?

WTTG delivered "Hazel."

And the first ratings report is phenomenal! Telecast each weeknight at 8:00 p.m. against three network shows, "Hazel" delivered 26% more women and 16% more homes than the average of her network time period competitors.

MONDAY-FRIDAY/8:00-8:30 PM

	Programming	Homes	Women
WTTG (Ind.)	HAZEL	150,000	104,700
WMAL-TV (ABC)	Network	132,300	80,500
WRC-TV (NBC)	Network	146,900	96,300
WTOP-TV (CBS)	Network	110,400	72,400

"Hazel" also delivered almost 100,000 more homes and 58,000 more women than WTTG's programming in the same time period last year.

MONDAY-FRIDAY/8:00-8:30 PM

	Programming	Homes	Women
Oct. 1967	HAZEL	150,000	104,700
Oct. 1966	Various Syndicated Programs	54,600	46,200

Source: ARB, October 1966 and 1967. Data subject to qualifications published by the rating service.

"Hazel" is available in 154 half-hour episodes, 120 in full color; distributed exclusively by Screen Gems.

ON LOCATION

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wondered "is this what the art form is about? Is this a national motion picture house?"

Grant Tinker, vice president, network programs, Universal City Studios, said that it was "cut and dried" that movies on television are "what an audience wants to see." Referring to George Stevens, who last year sought an injunction to keep his production of "A Place in the Sun" off of NBC-TV, Tinker observed that the producer-director "sitting at home at midnight, secretly is pleased that people see his picture even with commercials."

Probably the most arresting statements of the more than two-hour-long session were made by Heston and Lafferty. The actor claimed that the people who make motion pictures, almost without exception, are opposed to their TV exposure. No matter how great the movie originally, he submitted, "they are not great movies the way they are released on television."

Lafferty had a ready reply to this. "It all can be fixed in the future," he said. "From this day on all they have to do is put in the contract that they will not be sold to television when they make the picture. And if the company wants to give up 800 or 900 grand that they get from television, that's their business."

And so it went throughout the rest of the long night's journey into repetition. Like discussions about religion, politics and the war in Vietnam, it was hopeless to begin with. Confrontations among realists and somewhat embittered idealists rarely turn out productively. It's doubtful that a single opinion was changed. The Hollywood chapter of the National Television Academy tried hard but movies for television are still an enigma viewed with alarm by most of Hollywood.

MORRIS GELMAN

NEW YORK:

An often-used prop on NBC's *The Monkees* is a life-sized dummy labeled "Burt Schneider."

In scenery on *The Jerry Lewis Show*, the name "Finkel" repeatedly turns up on everything from "Finkel's hot-dog stand" to "Finkel's shoe-repair shop."

To the audience it means nothing, but to TV insiders it's providing a new game, something on the order of those old cartoon drawings that invited the reader to "find nine things wrong with this picture." Now it's spot the inside joke on the television show.

Thus, on a recent Sunday evening, as part of the standard opening format on CBS's *Mission: Impossible*, head undercover agent Peter Graves opened the packet containing photographs of candidates for assignment to that week's mission. To the average viewer, one photograph momentarily scanned and tossed aside may have looked like any other Central Casting character. It was Mike Dann, CBS-TV vice president-programs. The next week on the same show, the photograph of another rejected potential agent should have been familiar to sharp-eyed stockholders of the network: It was CBS Board Chairman William S. Paley. It's part of a running inside gag involving CBS executives tossed in by the show's executive producer, Bruce Geller.

Like the NBC jokes (Burt Schneider is co-producer of *The Monkees*; Robert Finkel is executive producer of the Lewis show), the *Mission: Impossible* house jokes are part of what knowing viewers around New York detect as a growing use of intramural ribbing in recent seasons.

Of course this type of esoteric gag is an old show-business staple. Remember Phil Harris's running commentary on the drinking habits of band member Frankie Remley on the old Jack Benny radio show, or Alfred Hitchcock appearing in one scene in almost all of his movies? But in addition to their growing frequency on network television, some inside viewers note the pixieness of the jibes may be a little more daring in a medium where hired hands are supposed to be careful to avoid any action that might draw the unpredictable displeasure of a lofty boss.

To be sure, most of those sneaking in the all-but-subliminal punches these days are well established. Within a week of Dann's photo appearance on *Mission*, Art Carney and Jackie Gleason were doing a boxing skit on the *Gleason Show* in which they kept referring to a notorious turn-of-the-century pug named Mike Dann. (The inside jokes may be spreading through the family tree, too. A recent full-page ad in the *Wall Street Journal* for a financial institution featured the headline, "Will Al Dann Get Some Information Today that Could Cost Him a Fortune?" Al Dann, Mike's brother, is press agent for McCann-Erickson, agency that created the ad.)

Some shows do much more ribbing that others. Last season *The Monkees* had a fall guy in one show named Bud Rukeyser (to those in the know, NBC vice president, press and publicity.)

Most of the quicky jokes that get seeded into regular programing come from the West Coast, according to an NBC official, because in addition to "being a little bit wilder out there," there are fewer people in the business than there are in New York and "they're a closer family."

ABC's filmed programs seem to carry fewer of these almost unnoticeable gags, but it doesn't mean the personnel of some shows aren't up to ribbing their bosses. "A lot of them slip things in to startle us when we watch rough cuts of shows," says one West Coast ABC man, but, he adds, most of it never gets on the air because "they don't get a rise out of us unless it's pretty strong"—too strong to be seen by the public.

As an example, he cites *Big Valley*, in which producer Lou Morheim has sent in footage including a two-shot of star Barbara Stanwyck and co-star Linda Evans rifling through a duffle bag. They pulled out a hat, a six gun, a frying pan, and then an athletic supporter. In another sequence actor Peter Breck grabbed a girl bent on mayhem and as he planted a paralyzing kiss on her, she gradually released her grip on the weapons she carried. The camera panned down to their feet as first she dropped her gun, then a knife, a length of rope—and then her brassiere.

Most comedians-emcees seem to have favorite butts for their house jokes and these shows probably produce the greatest batch of inside jibes. The *Tonight Show* often uses the names of network personnel. Dave Tebet, vice president in charge of talent, is a frequent target of Johnny Carson.

Herb Schlosser, NBC vice president in charge of West Coast production (who gets his own share of on-the-air ribbing), says: "It's made Dave something of a celebrity. I was with him one day when we were introduced to a man who actually said: 'Aren't you the fellow Johnny Carson talks about?' "

Bob Hope regularly worked into skits the name of Grant Tinker, then NBC vice president-programs until a couple of seasons ago, and he still uses the much-more widely known name of General Sarnoff.

In addition to Finkel, Schlosser is a favorite subject of Jerry Lewis figuring as everything from the butt of an ad-lib line when some


We tested your commercial.
Before you wrote it.
We're sure it will sell.
Because we found this out: the color is superb, the video image unexcelled.
Nobody in any business tests the basic material like Kodak tests film. So every commercial made with our film system starts out with an equal chance in the marketplace. The crucial factor from here on out is creativity—and the best creative people are film people. Today's top writers, directors, cameramen, editors, grew up in the medium—know its flexibility. Whatever mood or effect they're after, they can rely on Eastman film to come through with flying colors. We know. We already ran it up the flagpole.
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ON LOCATION

from page 8

thing goes wrong to mention buried as deeply as in a recent medicine-man skit in which Lewis began rattling off the names of various "herbs" that went into an elixer and "Schlosser" came somewhere between beetroot and witch hazel.

Sometimes the needle may get a bit sharp for the comfort of some network personnel sensitive to past gossip and palace purges. An uninformed audience must have been baffled, while a few CBS officials winced, during a recent *Red Skelton Hour*. The comedian broke up the other performers on-stage during a bit about TV programing when he suddenly ad-libbed something to the effect that: "If things get any worse, maybe they'll even bring back Keefe Brasselle."

Whether it was an alert youngster or a surprised adult, someone caught the gag that went into *George of the Jungle*, a Saturday-morning cartoon show on ABC. At that unlikely hour, *Bullwinkle* creator Jay Ward got some personal revenge with "Super Chicken," an episodic series within the show. Several episodes were broadcast last fall before someone noticed that the name of the series' rooster protagonist was Hunt Stromberg Jr., also the name of the CBS West Coast programing chief at the time Ward unsuccesfully tried a television pilot for that network in the fall of 1964. ABC thought it was a bit too much of an inside joke and ordered the name changed for the rest of "Super Chicken." (It also rejected Ward's next name choice: "Nelson Cluckerfeller.")

Do the network executives get a kick out of seeing references to themselves pop up on network shows, or does it offend their sense of grey-flannel decorum?

"They don't react," says an NBC employe. "They go along with it because they realize that's show biz." WALTER SPENCER

LONDON:

Britain's 14.3% devaluation in November is another blow to American hopes of selling more filmed and taped material to British television stations. Obversely it is going to increase the competetiveness of British product. The Americans had been under attack for some time; in any case they operate under a quota system. The BBC voluntarily restricts its foreign material to 12% of total hours; the Independent Television Authority limits the commercial stations it controls to 14% foreign material. The ITA quota is slightly elastic, however, for there is an "outer quota" of material with some British money tied up in its production, or with some desirable attributes (Redifusion, London's television station, has a tie-up with a number of non-American stations which take turns producing hour-long documentary programs).

The crunch about the use of foreign material by the commercial stations came a couple of years ago. At that time more than half the 8-9 p.m. prime, prime-time slots were being filled with crime and western series, most, by their nature, of American origin. So when the ITA told the companies to play down on the crime and cowboys, this was taken as an anti-American gesture. Since then the whole evening schedules have been rejigged, to lead up to the new half-hour news broadcast at 10 p.m., where previously there was 15 minutes at 8:50 p.m. So now the dramas and documentaries that used to start after the news have been put forward and now intrude into peak time. This has severely limited the number of American series in prime time, a fact that accounts for their relatively modest showing in the ratings charts. The trend has been toward increased numbers of series in the late evening (*Peyton Place, The Untouchables*) or the early evening (*The Monkees* and *Batman*).

Clearly there will be more penetration by old American feature films, which are exceedingly popular (commercial television runs two on a Sunday) and likely to be more so. But, with only two channels and a limited amount of air time permitted, the demand for American movies is unlikely to cause any great uprush in prices over the next few years—British filmmakers have the edge, since their product is not subject to any quota. Color of course will be a joker in the pack. At the moment it is confined to the BBC's second service, which is on UHF—with technical troubles of its own, compounded by the apparent inability of British setmakers to generate a production volume of reliable color receivers. But when both major channels change to color in a couple of years there could be a shortage of color product, although both sides are aware of this and stock piling as much as they can.

This is where British production for American screens comes in, since this has been entirely made in color for some time. Associated Television, the biggest of the commercial companies, has gone headlong for the American market with its now wholly owned subsidiary, Independent Television Corp. This is largely the work of ATV's ebullient managing director Lew Grade—a former agent who was responsible for booking many American artists in the major British variety halls during the nineteen fifties. ITC can bring in an hour series at around $60,000 an episode; so that when it sold 13 episodes of *Danger Man*—which CBS screened as *Secret Agent*—for $1,750,000, it was doing very nicely. A combination of persistent salesmanship, not over-estimating the intelligence of market either side of the Atlantic, and ability to deliver acceptable material at reasonable cost, has led to a steady stream of ITC product used as summer replacements.

But the British have now got the confidence that they can compete with the Americans, and, if necessary, produce something distinctive that will also sell. *The Avengers,* made by another major British commercial station, Associated British Picture, (a quarter owned by Seven Arts because of its take-over of Warner Bros.) was not designed for American viewers, yet has been as successful as Lew Grade's productions, which were and are designed for American viewing and for which the company got a 'Queen's Award' as outstanding reporters.

One further intriguing possibility has been opened up, now that the Harlech consortium, headed by Lord Harlech (formerly as David Ormsby-Gore, British ambassador in John Kennedy's Washington), has the new contract for television in the west of England and Wales. For among Lord Harlech's colleagues are Mr. and Mrs. Richard Burton. And other fellow directors of Lord Harlech's are talking about regular shows featuring the Burtons, which would be naturally snapped up by the American networks, and which would be seen by the lucky people in the Harlech area—but which the rest of the British commercial companies would have to pay through the nose for. In the past, of course, the bigger companies have paid only a few hundred pounds for shows bought from the regional stations, so this could be a sweet revenge. And the revenge would be even greater if the rumors turned out to be true, and Lord Harlech were to marry Jacqueline Kennedy. The Liz n' Jackie show . . . now that would be something. NICHOLAS FAITH

For thousands, Martha's Vineyard is an exclusive summer resort. For 103, it's the poorest community in Massachusetts.

Terry Carter has spent a lot of time on the wrong side of e tracks in Massachusetts.

As a reporter for Group W station WBZ-TV in Boston, art of his beat is the poverty program. It's taken him rough some of the worst sections of the state.

But one day, while reading a routine report, he found reference to people he'd never even heard of.

The Gay Head Indians of Martha's Vineyard.

By asking a few questions, he found that they're the dest community in Massachusetts. And the poorest. But obody seemed to know much more than that.

Terry decided to find out about these people. But etting to interview them wasn't easy. What they lack in ealth, they make up for in pride. But Terry persisted, nd was finally given permission.

He found that the Gay Head Indians make most of their oney fishing for scallops. But good scallop fishing only sts about two weeks a year.

The only other source of income is the trinkets they sell the summer people. But Terry saw the humiliation of proud people having to sell trinkets to feed their children.

The Gay Head Indians are fighting for survival. There are only 103 left. Only 8 children in the school house.

Terry Carter put together a news story he hoped would bring their struggle to light. He filmed Martha's Vineyard not as a summer playground, but as the barren winter home of a tribe of Indians fighting for survival.

And this is how the WBZ-TV audience saw it. It wasn't long before the first offers of help began arriving.

We like to think of Terry Carter as a typical Group W reporter. And we like to think of this story as typical of the way any one of our newsmen at any one of our 12 stations handles an assignment.

When we give a man a beat, we expect him to get involved. To become a part of it.

And then, like Terry Carter, he may even find the story nobody knew was there.

GROUP W

BOSTON WBZ · WBZ-TV
NEW YORK WINS
PHILADELPHIA KYW · KYW-TV
BALTIMORE WJZ-TV
PITTSBURGH KDKA · KDKA-TV
FORT WAYNE WOWO
CHICAGO WIND
SAN FRANCISCO KPIX
LOS ANGELES KFWB

WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING COMPANY

perspective



1968

LETTERS

The whole show
Perhaps this has already been done. Why not run a list of all the network shows that have ever been on the air? This would be a valuable reference source for many people.
Dave Carter, director, educational television, University of Kentucky, Ashland, Ky.
(A list of all prime-time network programs appearing up to that time was published in October 1964. For regularly scheduled programs in each season since then see "Telecast" fold-outs in May 1965, June 1966 and June 1967.—Ed.)

Syndication slips
Just when I get enthused about the new TELEVISION I hit page 40 in the December issue, and I can hardly believe what I'm reading. I expect a fair amount of sloppiness in most broadcasting trade papers, but not in TELEVISION. There are two points in the "off network" article that MGM-TV would like to take issue with.
In the listing of series off the NBC network which [you say] were never syndicated is *Dr. Kildare*. I am sure somebody in your office knows better than this.
Our *Mr. Novak* is not in syndication for reasons that have been stated previously in the press, and that is its high residual costs involving the two lead characters. There has, in fact, been continual interest from stations inquiring about possible release of this series in syndication.
Keith A. Culverhouse, director of advertising, MGM Television, New York.

In a sampling of "the series you can't buy" your reporter lists *Burke's Law* and *Amos Burke, Agent*. ABC had 64 episodes of *Burke's Law* and 17 of *Amos Burke, Agent*. The 81 episodes are now being sold by Four Star. The show is being telecast in 41 markets.
Harry Algus, McFadden, Strauss, Eddy & Irwin, New York.

All the way
I think your December issue is the smartest looking and most informative trade magazine I have ever read. It may be the smartest looking and most informative "any kind" of magazine I have ever read.
Alexander Cantwell, producer, New York.

Double feature
As both a reader and an advertiser in your two trade magazines, let me take this opportunity for a few comments. *Broadcasting* continues to be the *New York Times* among our industry's trade press—newsworthy, timely, complete and often definitive.
Your new TELEVISION is, in both content and design, the most exciting and satisfying happening in the trade press in many years. Because of what you have done to the book, I spend a considerable amount of time with it now, and the time spent is always a pleasure.
William C. Aden Jr., sales promotion manager, CBS Films, New York

Labor lore
Your three-part series on television unions [October, November, December 1967] by John Gardiner and Morris Gelman is a superior piece of journalism, a real service.
I would like to make copies to send to the Educational Television Stations Labor Committee (the managers of the 11 ETV stations that have contracts) in case they missed it.
Michael E. Hobbs, Educational Television Stations, Washington.
(Permission granted.—Ed.)

Marketer's need
I have recently joined Libby, McNeill & Libby as director of marketing development. In this position I am going to have need for your publication . . . I look forward to receiving your publication regularly.
Gray E. LaPore, director of marketing development, Libby, McNeill & Libby, Chicago.

Western influence
I have read with great interest "Why Diversification Is the Name of the Game" [a study of the conglomerates emerging in television ownership] in your October 1967 issue. In the Japanese broadcasting industry stations are now operating hotels, real-estate agencies and electric appliances shops. So I think this article is very important.
Tsunehiro Fujiwara, Kubota Advertising Laboratory, Tokyo.

NATIONAL GOOF TURNS INTO LOCAL GAIN

dividend of 12½ cents a share. Metromedia was up 13% as it reported record third-quarter and nine-month gross revenues and net income. Net income per share was 60 cents for the quarter ended Oct. 1, compared to 59 cents the year before, and $2.37 for the nine months, compared to $2.24 for the same nine months in 1966. Metromedia also declared its first stock dividend—2%, payable on March 15—in addition to its regular 20 cents a share quarterly dividend.

Taft Broadcasting was up 10%. It elected David S. Ingalls of Cleveland board chairman, to replace Hulbert Taft Jr.—who was killed

Iow can a network series like the Man from U.N.C.L.E. become available for local station programming in mid season? Because networks use a national rating ervice that represents rural as well as city viewing, ue market-by-market performance can be put in false perspective. U.N.C.L.E. is in First or Second lace in 15 out of the 22 markets rated in October. ook at the shares over 30. This is where *you care* about performance. In your market. So someone goofed on the national scene. So now you can make it big on the local scene with U.N.C.L.E.—still the original, still the swingingest show of its kind. When, in fact, did you ever have the opportunity to get such a hot property so highly rated off the network? You might never be so lucky again. Take advantage now. Be the *one* in your market to have this show.

THE MAN FROM U.N.C.L.E. LOCAL PERFORMANCE



128 hours of high-spying adventure.

Call your MGM Television man and say U.N.C.L.E.

MGM
TELEVISION



The city that turns us on

an Francisco is the city that sets the pace, nakes the trends, starts the styles. San Francisco: ne of a kind. Unique.

n the San Francisco Bay Area, viewers are turning on TVU, the only television station that programs its entire chedule to match the varied tastes of this market.

o when you need impact and coverage, go to the ndependent that's tuned to the market and gives you a net eekly circulation of 1,204,700 TV homes. The Nation's eading Independent TV Station.*

RESENTED BY H R TELEVISION
B Net Weekly Circulation March 1966 Coverage Study. Any res quoted or derived from audience surveys are estimates ect to sampling and other errors. Original reports can be ewed for details on methodology.

KTVU 2
SAN FRANCISCO • OAKLAND

Cox Broadcasting Corporation stations: WSB AM-FM-TV, Atlanta; WHIO AM-FM-TV, Dayton; WSOC AM-FM-TV, Charlotte; WIOD AM-FM, Miami; WIIC-TV, Pittsburgh; KTVU San Francisco-Oakland

FOCUS ON FINANCE

General market recovery leads to gains in most television stocks

Television stocks made a mild comeback from their October-November slump. The TELEVISION index of selected stocks climbed 2% during the period from Nov. 13 to Dec. 13.

All categories except manufacturing gained, reflecting the recovery of the market in general. Even so, the television stocks recouped only half as much as the 4% overall market gain shown by the Standard & Poor's industrial average for the same period. And the improvement remains far from catching up to the 7% drop the television stocks suffered during the October-November period.

Pacing the television categories was television with other major interests, which showed a gain of 12.5%. Almost as strong were the purely television stocks, up 10.7%, and programing stocks, which rose 9.8%.

Among the individual stocks, ABC went up 11% as favorable rumors continued to circulate about the pending federal court ruling on the network's proposed merger with International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. CBS went up 14% as it continued to dominate the rating charts and the network announced it was ready, a month earlier than usual, to lock up next season's line-up with a minimal change of only three or four shows.

Corinthian was up 8% as it announced the highest earnings in the history of the company for both the second quarter and the six months ended Oct. 31. Net income for the quarter was $951,813, compared to $947,092 for the same 1966 period, and $1,816,021 for the six months, compared to $1,783,497 for the previous year's comparable period. Per-share income was down slightly for both periods because of the greater number of shares now outstanding.

Cox was up 11% as its directors declared a regular quarterly cash dividend of 12½ cents a share. Metromedia was up 13% as it reported record third-quarter and nine-month gross revenues and net income. Net income per share was 60 cents for the quarter ended Oct. 1, compared to 59 cents the year before, and $2.37 for the nine months, compared to $2.24 for the same nine months in 1966. Metromedia also declared its first stock dividend—2%, payable on March 15—in addition to its regular 20 cents a share quarterly dividend.

Taft Broadcasting was up 10%. It elected David S. Ingalls of Cleveland board chairman, to replace Hulbert Taft Jr., who was killed in an accident on his Cincinnati estate in November. Ingalls had been vice chairman of the board.

CATV stocks were up almost 2.5% as the Supreme Court agreed to review two major cable television legal issues: the FCC's regulatory authority over CATV operations and copyright liabilities of cable systems.

Teleprompter stock was up 10% amid renewed reports that MGM is negotiating to acquire it. MGM's stock, however, was down 4%. Teleprompter also got a major boost for one of its important operations—CATV service to half of Manhattan—as the city of New York extended its franchise for two more years.

The biggest jump of any individual stock in the index was that of Avco, in the television-with-other-major-interests category. It shot up 40%, apparently as a result of rumors that Avco planned to make a tender offer for 20th Century-Fox stock. Avco denied the report. Avco also announced that as a result of its merger with the Paul Revere Corp., Avco operations are being divided into four major groups—insurance, financial services, commercial and industrial products, and government products and services. The financial services subsidiary, Avco Delta Corp., also announced that arrangements have been made for direct placement of $23.5 million of senior notes. Proceeds are to be used for expansion and to pay debts.

Chris-Craft stock was up 5% as its board of directors declared a regular quarterly cash dividend of 25 cents a share plus a year-end extra cash dividend of 30 cents a share.

Gulf & Western stock was up 9% as it issued its annual report showing record sales and earnings for the 10th straight year. Net earnings were up 130% over the previous year and net earnings per common share were up 42%—$3.91 in fiscal 1967, compared to $2.75 in 1966.

Rollins stock registered a major increase, up 30%, as it announced a five-to-four split of its two classes of common stock and revealed plans to increase dividend rates on the new shares. The split on common and class B common will be issued Jan. 25. Rollins declared usual quarterly dividends of 7½ cents a share on common and 3¾ cents a share on class B common, also payable Jan. 25. It said that after the split, quarterly dividends will be declared on the same basis, providing a 25% dividend increase.

Rollins reported record revenues, earnings and cash flow for the second quarter ended Oct. 31. The earnings of $1.03 a share compare with 85 cents in the same 1966 period.

Storer was up 18% amid rumors that the Times-Mirror Corp. of Los Angeles was planning a tender offer for its stock. A Times-Mirror spokesman, however, said: "There are currently no serious negotiations between the two companies. . . ."

Among the programing stocks, Columbia was up 13%, apparently on the basis of the box-office success of its recent feature-film release, "To Sir With Love" and the anticipated success of two new releases: "In Cold Blood" and "Guess Who's Coming to Dinner."

Wall Street observers had no explanation for the 26% dip in Four Star TV, except the continuing speculative dealing in the stock. Screen Gems was up 13% as its annual report for the fiscal year ended July 1 showed the most profitable year in the firm's 18-year history and the ninth straight year in which a record net income was reached. Per-share earnings for the year were $1.42, compared to $1.31 a share for fiscal 1966. Screen Gems

Continued on page 19

The Television stock index

A monthly summary of market movement in the shares of 67 companies associated with television.

FINANCE

	Exchange	Closing Dec. 13	Closing Nov. 13	Change from Nov. 13 Points	Change from Nov. 13 %	1967 High	1967 Low	Approx. Shares Out (000)	Total Market Capitalization (000)
Television									
ABC	N	77	69¼	+7¾	+11	102	67	4,682	$360,500
CBS	N	53⅞	47⅜	+6½	+14	75	46	23,300	1,255,300
Capital Cities	N	43½	40⅞	+2⅝	+6	53	35	2,746	119,500
Corinthian	N	26⅝	24¾	+1⅞	+8	30	23	3,384	90,100
Cox	N	55¼	49¾	+5½	+11	59	35	2,827	156,200
Gross Telecasting	O	31½	31	+½	+2	34	24	400	12,600
Metromedia	N	57½	50⅞	+6⅝	+13	66	40	2,194	126,200
Reeves Broadcasting	A	10	11	−1	−9	13	5	1,809	18,100
Scripps-Howard	O	24¾	26¼	−1½	−6	34	24	2,589	64,100
Taft	N	37⅞	35¼	+3⅝	+10	49	32	3,361	127,300
Wometco	N	33⅝	36	−2⅜	−7	38	21	2,226	74,800
							Total	49,518	2,404,700
CATV									
Ameco	A	9⅞	9¾	+⅛	+1	14	7	1,200	11,900
Entron	O	5¾	6⅛	−⅜	−6	8	5	617	3,500
H&B American	A	16¾	18⅝	−1⅞	−10	28	4	2,637	44,200
Jerrold	O	39¾	38	+1¾	+5	52	21	2,318	92,100
Teleprompter	A	35¾	32⅝	+3⅛	+10	37	13	994	35,500
Vikoa	A	17⅛	15⅛	+2	+13	19	11	1,359	23,300
							Total	9,125	210,500
Television with other major interests									
Avco	N	57¼	40¾	+16½	+40	65	22	14,075	805,800
Bartell Media	A	9⅝	10⅛	−½	−5	12	4	2,045	19,700
Boston Herald-Traveler	O	49	59	−10	−17	72	48	540	26,500
Broadcast Industries	O	2¾	3¼	−½	−15	4	1	632	1,100
Chris-Craft	N	36½	34⅞	+1⅝	+5	42	22	1,663	60,700
Cowles Communications	N	15¾	14½	+1¼	+9	21	14	2,944	46,400
Fuqua Industries	N	63¼	53⅝	+9⅝	+18	74	27	1,098	44,700
General Tire	N	26⅝	25⅝	+1	+4	38	26	16,719	445,100
Gulf & Western	N	54¼	50	+4¼	+9	62	30	11,620	630,400
Lin Broadcasting	O	18	16⅛	+1⅞	+12	29	7	789	14,200
Meredith Publishing	N	26	27⅛	−1⅛	−4	38	26	2,662	69,200
The Outlet Co.	N	26¾	27¼	−½	−2	30	15	1,033	27,600
Rollins	A	54½	41⅞	+12⅝	+30	55	23	3,087	168,200
Rust Craft Greeting	O	31½	32	−½	−2	43	28	727	22,900
Storer	N	43½	36⅞	+6⅝	+18	59	35	4,157	180,800
Time Inc.	N	96¾	98¾	−2	−2	115	89	6,560	634,700
							Total	70,351	3,198,600
Programing									
Columbia Pictures	N	52⅞	46¾	+6⅛	+13	56	33	2,140	113,200
Disney	N	58⅛	51½	+6⅝	+13	57	38	4,026	234,000
Filmways	A	24	23⅛	+⅞	+4	27	13	724	17,400
Four Star TV	O	6	8⅛	−2⅛	−26	9	2	666	4,000
MCA	N	69⅞	63¾	+6⅛	+10	70	35	4,707	328,900
MGM	N	54½	56¾	−2¼	−4	65	31	5,563	303,200
Screen Gems	A	29⅛	25¾	+3⅜	+13	34	21	4,036	117,500
Trans-Lux	A	20¾	21¾	−1	−5	30	14	718	14,900
20th Century-Fox	N	30⅞	23	+7⅞	+34	30	16	6,069	187,400
Walter Reade Organization	O	9	6⅞	+2⅛	+31	10	1	1,583	14,200
Warner-Seven Arts	A	37⅜	37	+⅜	+1	42	20	2,547	95,200
Wrather Corp.	O	3½	3¾	−¼	−7	4	2	1,753	6,100
							Total	34,559	1,436,000
Service									
John Blair	O	25¼	25¾	−½	−2	36	15	1,012	25,600
Comsat	N	50⅞	45⅝	+5¼	+12	78	41	10,000	508,800
Doyle Dane Bernbach	O	43	42	+1	+2	53	22	1,994	85,700
Foote, Cone & Belding	N	14¾	16⅛	−1⅜	−9	21	14	2,146	31,700
General Artists	O	8	8	—	—	11	4	600	4,800
Grey Advertising	O	16½	18¾	−2¼	−12	25	16	1,201	19,800
MPO Videotronics	A	11⅝	12⅛	−½	−4	17	6	469	5,500
Movielab	A	19⅛	20⅜	−1¼	−6	28	10	1,099	21,000
Nielsen	O	40¼	38	+2¼	+6	42	29	5,130	206,500
Ogilvy & Mather	O	16	16¾	−¾	−4	20	10	1,087	17,400
Papert, Koenig, Lois	A	5⅝	6	−⅜	−6	9	6	791	4,400
							Total	25,529	931,200
Manufacturing									
Admiral	N	18⅜	20½	−2⅛	−10	38	18	5,062	93,000
Ampex	N	35⅞	31¾	+4⅛	+13	41	23	9,480	310,100
General Electric	N	98¼	100¾	−2½	−2	116	82	91,068	8,947,400
Magnavox	N	40	43¼	−3¼	−8	50	34	15,410	616,400
3M	N	95⅜	86⅞	+8½	+10	95	75	53,466	5,099,300
Motorola	N	120½	126¾	−6¼	−5	147	90	6,117	737,100
National Video	A	21⅜	24½	−3⅛	−13	46	20	2,781	59,400
RCA	N	53¾	56¾	−3	−5	66	43	62,465	3,357,500
Reeves Industries	A	7⅛	7⅛	—	—	9	2	3,327	23,700
Westinghouse	N	72½	70⅞	+1⅝	+2	79	46	37,571	2,723,900
Zenith Radio	N	55	59¾	−4¾	−8	72	48	18,783	1,033,100
							Total	305,530	23,030,900
							Grand Total	494,610	$31,211,900
Standard & Poor Industrial Average		104.03	100.13	+3.90	+4	106.15	85.31		

N-New York Stock Exchange
A-American Stock Exchange
O-Over the counter

Data compiled by Roth, Gerard & Co.

FOCUS ON FINANCE

from page 17

also made Jerome S. Hyams president. He had been executive vice president and general manager. Abraham Schneider, former president, was named chairman and chief executive officer.

Twentieth Century-Fox's 34% leap was laid to the rumors of its proposed acquisition, either by Avco or City Investing Co. Fox announced third-quarter and nine-months earnings increases. For the quarter, per-share earnings were 65 cents, compared to 54 cents for the corresponding 1966 period; nine-month earnings were $1.93 a share, compared to $1.58 in 1966. Fox also offered $28,138,600 in 5.75% convertible subordinated debentures, due Dec. 1, 1992, to common stockholders, and overseas offered $40 million in 5% convertible debentures due Dec. 1, 1987.

Warner-Seven Arts was up 1% as it reported a first-quarter loss lower than anticipated. Officials said the loss of "less than $500,000" in the quarter ended Sept. 30 was much smaller than originally expected and that the box office success of several pictures, including "Cool Hand Luke" and "Bonnie and Clyde" should result in a profitable second quarter. The first quarter loss was laid to expenses in merging Warner Bros. and Seven Arts and to lack of profit from some films. The company also announced completion of its previously revealed purchase of Atlantic Recording Corp. (Atco), a maker of phonograph records, for $17 million in cash and stock.

Service stocks were up an average of 2.7%. Leader among them was Comsat, which was up 12% despite a slight decline in third-quarter earnings. Per-share earnings for the three months ended Sept. 30 were 8 cents, a penny less than for the previous quarter.

Manufacturing stocks, on the average, remained virtually unchanged, as they showed a decline of 0.5%. Among them, Ampex showed the biggest gain, 13%, as it announced record sales and earnings for the second quarter and first six months. Per-share earnings for the quarter were 31 cents, against 27 cents for the same period the year before. For the first half, per-share earnings were 53 cents, compared to 47 cents in the same period of 1966.

RCA, parent company of NBC, was off 5% despite announcement that its regular quarterly dividend will be raised from 20 cents a share to 25 cents, payable on Feb. 1. END

CLOSEUP

RICHARD M. PACK Call letters of all the stations he has worked for would make a reasonably thick alphabet soup, but that's only because he grew up with radio in the 30's. For the last 13 years Pack has been Westinghouse Broadcasting's Mr. Programing. He was recently elected president of Westinghouse's Group W Films, a title he carries in addition to that of senior vice president of Westinghouse Broadcasting for programing and production. In the grand old Hollywood tradition, Westinghouse is supporting production of low-budget quickly produced feature films. They're designed to satisfy some of the program appetite of the group's five stations as well as others through syndication. But first they go into theatrical release. Pack says: "We saw that the supply of films was diminishing and getting more expensive. Some percentage of today's feature films, even with cuts, will never be available for television." Thus, Westinghouse's decision to produce its own features. The film unit has been quietly gathering strength for the past two years. Ten films have been produced so far, all on budgets in the neighborhood of $350,000. Some of the titles already completed are "The Tall One", "Limbo Line" and "The Man Outside." None have been aired yet as they are still in theatrical distribution. Pack's unit does not handle the actual production, nor does Westinghouse wholly finance each film. Sydney Pink was the producer under contract with Westinghouse for the 10 completed films. Sydney Box, an independent London producer, has contracted for a further six pictures a year. Laughs Pack: "Actually, we only make deals with people named Sydney." In 25 years of broadcasting, the Westinghouse program boss has been an innovator in local news and cultural programing. Along the way he has picked up a Peabody Award and a Sylvania Award. After joining Westinghouse in 1954, Pack was one of the founding fathers of the *Mike Douglas Show* and the *Merv Griffin Show*. He lives in Great Neck, N.Y., with his wife and two children. What does this busy program man do with his spare time? "I'm looking for a hobby. I always feel a little guilty because I have no major hobby."

DONALD E. KLAUBER is in charge of the world, as far as Warner-Bros.-Seven Arts is concerned. He is the merged corporation's new executive vice president in charge of worldwide television and production. Part of the relatively young Seven Arts management team that has ascended to dominence in the merged organization, Klauber formerly was executive vice president and general sales manager of Seven Arts Associated, where his principal concern was acquisition and sale of feature films both to the networks and in syndication. His principal concern at the moment "is now building a strong young executive staff" as a keystone of the major overhaul of W7 forces being carried out. Klauber, himself, is 41. His rise to the executive offices of the television business came by way of the Seventh Avenue garment world. A native New Yorker, he attended New Jersey's Farleigh Dickinson University and Columbia University after service in the Navy during the last years of World War II. He quit Columbia a few credits short of graduation in business administration to get some practical experience in the subject as an assistant salesman and executive trainee at a Manhattan textile firm. Three years later he moved to another fabric firm as a salesman, and then in 1954 he made the jump from selling chintz to film prints when he joined Motion Pictures for Television. His next dozen years were spent gaining experience in syndication with MPTV, Associated Artists. United Artists Associated and, from 1960, at Seven Arts. Once the combined Warner-Seven Arts team is in final alignment, Klauber says his department "has set its goals to dramatically expand its activities in four major directions": (1) In programing "to restore the company to the prominence in nonfeature programing that we once enjoyed on the networks"; (2) to move into broadcasting ownership; (3) to continue building domestic sales while (4) moving into worldwide distribution of the combined company's library of some 2,000 motion pictures and 1,200 hours of nonfeature programing. In this new international division, Klauber sees "the most significant potential available to the company."

JOSEPH R. DALY, the new president of Doyle Dane Bernbach is well known in the television business. His roots go back to those frantic golden times when an account man personally bought major programing for his client on little more than a hunch. "I was the TV department of the agency," he recalls. "I bought the first minute in the Steve Allen *Tonight* show, and the first minute in it when Jack Paar took it over. Both were for Polaroid. I still feel that television has got some factors going for it that make it more effective than print. It's got some problems, of course. One is this bunching up of commercials and the clutter that surrounds them. I think our success has been in the opposite kind of TV where the message stands out. You know we buy television time abroad and so we've had experience with isolated commercials and bunched up ones. In Germany, where we have to run in blocks of solid time, there's considerable loss in effectiveness. There's no question in my mind which is better." Daly, who has worked on all of DDB's major accounts—Chemstrand. Polaroid, American Airlines, Avis. Mobil, Bristol-Myers—and now replaces William Bernbach as president, has also been associated with the rise of the TV special. He began his advertising career with what is now Chirurg & Cairns, after emerging from the armed forces at the end of World War II as a lieutenant commander in naval aviation. He was a fighter pilot on the carrier U.S.S. Enterprise and saw action throughout the Pacific. Upon discharge, he was the holder of the Navy Cross, the Purple Heart, the Air Medal—"stuff like that." He joined Doyle Dane Bernbach in November of 1949, six months after it was founded. A native of New York City, Daly now lives with his wife and seven children (aged 7 through 18) near Huntington, L.I. In his leisure time he devotes himself to the horses—he owns his own stable of seven—and watches a lot of television. His favorite programs? "What everybody else in this business watches—pro football and the movies."

THE BROADCASTERS' PROBLEM: HOW TO GET

SPOT

OFF ITS BIG, FAT PLATEAU

by Richard Donnelly

TELEVISION
JANUARY 1968 VOL. XXV NO. 1

Spot television's annual rate of gain over the years has ranged from 6% to 12%. For the year 1967 the most optimistic prediction for spot's growth rate over 1966 is: zero. Moreover, there are people who like to think themselves realists who predict a fall-off in billings of from 2% to 3%. Never before in the history of this immensely profitable medium has there been so much soul-searching. What went wrong? What do we do now? Those two questions haunt station managers and their national sales representatives. For perhaps the first time, people are beginning to *think* about spot, the way magazine people have been forced to think about magazines, the way network people think about networking.

Before moving on to the intriguing question of what can be done to restore spot television's rate of growth, it is essential to understand what happened in the past year and what has been happening to spot over the past several years. In a way, spot consists of two markets, the very rich and the not so rich. There is no question, as a special TELEVISION analysis of spot on page 26 shows, that the larger markets have been getting an increasingly larger share of the spot dollar. ("If you subtract the first 10 markets, then you get a true picture of what's been happening in spot for the past several years," says a spokesman for a major rep.)

This suggests that there has been a minor crisis in spot among the smaller and medium-sized markets for some time. In 1967, for reasons peculiar to 1967, the crisis became industry-wide. The major reason, cited by nearly everyone, is the uncertain state of the economy. "Business is off, profits are down, so clients are looking for ways to cut costs. One of the easiest to cut is advertising, and the quickest way is to take advantage of spot's flexibility and cut it," says an irritated agency media planner who doesn't see the problem. "Spot will get better when business gets better."

Says Warren Bahr, senior vice president, media, Young & Rubicam: "The basic thing is, manufacturers are facing difficult times and spot as one of the major movers of goods should reflect this."

But station managers can't hide behind large philosophical generalizations, however valid. As Jim Fuller, director of spot for Y&R, notes, the softness came at a time when station management generally had committed itself to plant expansion, enlargement of news staffs, new investments in color. Sales and station managers have had to answer some hard questions.

The first of those questions is, what happened? and the reply, slow-up in business, is probably too general. Certain specific things happen to spot television when the economy is in a slump that don't necessarily happen to other media. As noted, advertising investments are more quickly cut. Next, R&D programs are curtailed by clients. One result of this is a fall-off in new products, and spot, more and more the testing ground and proving ground and introductory ground for new products, suffers perhaps more than other media. But the several million dollars a year that may be used to launch a new product isn't all that's lost; also missing are the competitive moves that Ivory Snow or Dristan would have to make to fight off a new challenge. Without those new challenges, established brands are relatively secure and their spending continues at predictable levels.

Another effect of tight money is that a good amount of bargain-basement buying and bargain-basement selling—the quick, last minute sort of deal—is being done in other media to the detriment of spot.

It cannot be confirmed, but a story still circulating on Madison Avenue last month was that if you waited around long enough on a Friday afternoon you would get a call from one of the networks offering choice weekend availabilities—for a fraction of their original asking prices. A minute that normally went for $60,000 to $75,000 was suddenly available for, say, $10,000.

The several hundred managements of stations with their scores of national sales representatives cannot as yet match that kind of price flexibility (and some would refuse to). And so the softness in other media hurts spot in particular.

Says Justin Gerstle, vice president and director of media information and analysis division of Ted Bates & Co.: "It's the old empty-seats-on-a-plane analogy. Even in peak seasons many stations aren't sold out. If I were a station controller I'd worry about that. After all, everything has its price."

Says Bahr of Y&R: "It wouldn't hurt for stations to take a look and see what's happening in the network field. Sometimes they're simply outpriced."

The end result of a bad year, then, is a veiled and not-so-veiled appeal for price cutting.

The historical problems that led up to this critical moment in spot are essentially secondary to the general state of the economy. However, they are worth stating, for each has had its effect.

- The networks have expanded their programing, leaving that much less time available for spot representatives to sell (see TELEVISION, November 1967).
- At the same time, over the years the networks have learned to be nearly as flexible as spot in their sales policies.
- Spot remains a complicated medium to buy, and is actually less profitable for an agency to buy than network.
- Spot continues to be a confusing medium for the less-sophisticated clients.
- More and more of the money that is going into spot is going into the very biggest markets, so that even the big years of total billings may be relatively lean years for stations going down the scale in market size.

This last point needs further elaboration, for although it is commonly assumed that the larger markets have been getting an increasingly larger proportion of the total spot dollar, it may not be realized just how far things have gone. As the special TELEVISION analysis of annual Federal Communications Commission data on spot revenue by market (see page 26) shows, the top-10 markets (ranked according to their television homes) today account for *nearly 50% of spot revenue.*

This means, of course, that all of the remaining 214 television markets in the United States have to fight for the other half of spot's annual volume. And the trend shows no sign of abating.

In 1958, the percentage of total spot volume invested in the top-10 markets was 41.9%; by 1966, the last reported year, the top-10-market share of spot had climbed to 49.6%. In the same period the next 20 markets advanced only marginally in their portions of spot placements. Markets 11 through 20 inched ahead from 12.6% of total spot in 1958 to 13.1% in 1966. Markets 21 through 30 moved from a 9.2% share of spot dollars in 1958 to a 9.7% share in 1966. The top-30-market share of national spot spending in 1958: 63.7%; in 1966: 72.4%. It takes no more than rudimentary arithmetic to calculate the obverse. For all other markets in 1958: 36.3%; in 1966: 27.6%.

Another way to look at the same phenomenon: New York City alone in 1966 had 12.8% of that year's national spot investments, or almost as much as all of the combined shares of all markets ranked 11 through 20. Los Angeles, the second market, with a 9.5% share of total spot, took in almost as much as all 10 markets ranked 21 through 30.

As the table on page 26 reveals, signs of trouble start appearing in markets immediately below the top 30. The next 10 measurable markets, taken as a group, have been losing ground in recent years. Though their gross revenues from spot have been rising through 1966, as have those of most major markets, their portions of the total spot volume have declined. Collectively they accounted for 5.2% of

How spot TV makes out among national media

Spot's curve has been rising almost yearly since 1958, but not as fast as the curves of some rivals. Chart at right shows national ad expenditures (in millions of dollars) for time, space, talent, production. Estimates are McCann-Erickson's for *Marketing/Communications.*


1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Network TV
Magazines
Newspapers
Spot TV
Business Publications
Spot Radio
Outdoor
Network Radio
1,393.0
1,025.0
1,291.0
866.2
940.8
923.6
973.0
1,034.2
1,107.7
1,198.8
975.0
768.7
826.2
836.1
802.3
781.6
764.9
848.0
869.4
960.0
397.0
465.0
526.7
533.4
611.0
678.8
779.8
865.5
711.5
237.8
250.6
262.0
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115.0
115.0
116.6
120.1
117.7
64.8



1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Markets 1–10
49.6%
Markets 11–20
12.8%
13.1%
12.9%
13.1%
Markets 21–30
9.2%
9.6%
9.7%
9.2%
9.6%
9.5%
9.5%
9.8%
9.7%
All other Markets
34.4%
34.0%
33.0%
29.0%

More and more spot tonnage is dumped in biggest markets

Chart at left and table below show how spot advertisers have been placing bigger and bigger parcels of their business in the very largest television markets. In 1966 nearly half of all spot time sales were made in the 10 markets at the top. Figures are percentages of total U.S. spot time sales (before deduction of agency and rep commissions) going into individual markets in the years 1958 through 1966. Market rankings are by total television homes as in "Telestatus" (see page 62).

	1958 %	1959 %	1960 %	1961 %	1962 %	1963 %	1964 %	1965 %	1966 %
1. New York	12.6	12.7	13.0	13 7	12.7	13.4	13.2	12.6	12.8
2. Los Angeles	6.2	6.7	6.1	6.3	7.1	7.7	8.5	8.6	9.5
3. Chicago	5.8	6.0	6.1	6.7	6.6	6.7	7.3	7.2	7.1
4. Philadelphia	3.5	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1
5. Boston	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3
6. Detroit	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5
7. Cleveland	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.3
8. San Francisco-Oakland	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.7	3.8
9. Pittsburgh	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1
10. Washington	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.1
Total	41.9	43.2	43.2	44.9	45.4	46.9	48.1	48.2	49.6
11. St. Louis	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8
12. Dallas-Fort Worth	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6
13. Minneapolis-St. Paul	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1 2	1.2	1.2
14. Indianapolis	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3
15. Baltimore	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.3
16. Cincinnati	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
17. Houston	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3
18. Hartford-New Haven, Conn.	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.4
19. Milwaukee	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1
20. Kansas City, Mo.	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.1
Total	12.6	12.8	13.1	12.9	13.2	12.8	12.7	13.0	13.1
21. Buffalo, N.Y.	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4
22. Seattle-Tacoma	.2	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.2
23. Miami-Fort Lauderdale	1.	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3
24. Atlanta	(.	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.2
25. Sacramento-Stockton, Calif.	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9
26. Columbus, Ohio	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
27. Memphis	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5
28. Portland, Ore.	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.8
29. Denver	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
30. Tampa-St. Petersburg, Fla.	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Total	9.2	9.6	9.7	9.2	9.6	9.5	9.5	9.8	9.7

Following are the next 10 markets, in order of television homes, for which spot revenues are available as far back as 1958. Missing are the following (with rank order preceding in parentheses): (34) Birmingham, Ala.; (35) Providence, R. I.; (36) Syracuse, N. Y.; (38) Louisville, Ky.; (39) Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo, Mich., and (41) Dayton, Ohio. (FCC reports only on those markets with three or more stations on air.)

	1958 %	1959 %	1960 %	1961 %	1962 %	1963 %	1964 %	1965 %	1966 %
31. New Orleans	0.8	0.7	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
32. Nashville	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
33. Albany-Schenectady-Troy, N.Y.	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6
37. Charleston-Huntington, W. Va.	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
40. Oklahoma City	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
42. Wichita-Hutchinson, Kan.	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
43. Greenville-Spartanburg, S.C.-Asheville, N.C.	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
44. Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News, Va.	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
45. Omaha	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4
46. Salt Lake City	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4
Total	5.2	5.1	5.0	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.4

all spot revenue in 1958, for 4.4% in 1966.

Not until much later this year, when the FCC completes its unhurried tabulations of television financial reports for 1967 (probably around September 1968), will it be known how the individual markets fared in the year just ended. It seems safe to say, however, that if total spot made zero advance in 1967, some markets suffered actual declines in dollar volume. People are already beginning to point fingers at one another, and at things.

The reps tend to shrug helplessly in the face of a decline that is evident throughout the general economy; the agencies can barely conceal their pleasure at a condition that allows them to be the selective buyers of old; stations tend to look with coldness at their reps, with hostility at their networks, which are regarded as siphoning off spot budgets; the networks, ever resourceful, tend wherever they must to make whatever deals will cover the costs of programing and station compensation; advertisers, unaccustomed to such bargains, look for more.

In this situation, spot's particular versatility tends to get lost. The emphasis is on bargain prices, and in this climate advertisers tend to go to the media they know best—to magazines for magazines, to newspapers for national deals, to television for, well, network deals.

"Network is not only easier to buy, it's easier to sell," says a national sales rep. "Which would you buy, Gleason and Lucy, or a complicated lineup of stations in a lot of different markets at all sorts of time periods? You've got to remember, spot television has never been sold by anybody really. It just grew, thanks to the agencies."

Says an executive for a major national rep, who isn't himself in sales: "More than 70% of this business is *bought*, not sold."

Says an agency media supervisor, who would rather remain anonymous: "For the most part, broadcast salesmen are order takers. They're not as informed about spot as they should be, they're totally ignorant of other media and they're generally uninterested in advertising. You can't say that about print salesmen."

Spot sales representatives freely acknowledge that the routine of business comes to them unsolicited and that they have no influence on the plans board that determines what will be spent in what media. After budgets have been set and markets selected, the reps come in

Continued on page 52

The 21-inch view of Vietnam: big enough picture?

by Leonard Zeidenberg

Night after night the war goes on in living rooms all over the U.S. Does TV coverage clarify or becloud the debate about the war's aims and origins? Here the newsmen who have handled the story size up their work and their challenge.

In photographs on page at right: (1) Anne Morrissey of ABC News; (2) Ray Miller (r) KPRC-TV Houston; (3) Frank McGee (with sunglasses) of NBC News; (4) Art Peterson (r), KBTV(TV) Denver, (5) Phil James (l) and Les Solin of WCCO-TV Minneapolis.

Like the military establishment whose camp it is following, television is making a heavy investment in Vietnam, in money and effort, even in blood.

The trickle of correspondents and cameramen that began finding its way into Saigon in the early 1960's has swollen as the American military commitment has grown, until today there are some 100 U. S. network reporters, cameramen, soundmen, assorted editors and couriers accredited to Vietnam, augmented by station people who shuttle back and forth between, say, Sauk City and the central highlands looking for Sauk City boys to interview. Their product, flowing out in thousands of feet of film and thousands of words of script and ad-lib comment fills three- and four-minute bits on Cronkite and Huntley-Brinkley and Jennings every weekday evening (American Marines under fire at Con Thien, GI's inching their way up a numbered hill at Dakto, Buddhists demonstrating in the streets of Saigon) and provides the material for half-hour and hour in-depth examinations of the war by the networks' heavyweights and, in the case of the Sauk City crews, fills specials for home-town stations.

This is TV's first war, the saying goes (though those who say it tend to overlook the pioneering efforts that television newsmen, such as the late Ed Murrow, made during the Korean war). It is also the best-covered war ever, say some of those who cover it, for press as well as radio-TV. And certainly the every-day horrors of war have never been made so easily available for viewing—crisply edited down to essentials, flashed on the home screen between the film clips of the Everett Dirksens, Stokely Carmichaels, Lyndon B. Johnsons and other staples of the television journalistic scene.

Yet, at home, a feeling of uneasiness about the war persists. People wonder whether they understand the war or its causes. Certainly there is no unanimity on how it's going to end, or should end.

Is this uncertainty one fault of the journalistic effort in general, television's in particular? After all, more than 60% of the population is said to rely primarily on television for its news. Is there too much emphasis, again particularly in the case of television, on the bang-bang aspects of the war and not enough on the noncombat aspects (the so-called "other war"), or not enough effort to relate the variegated impressions given by the coverage into a whole that makes some kind of sense. Such criticism has been heard from time to time, from the press, and from the administration. (Give "our side" the benefit of the doubt, Vice President Humphrey is said to have asked reporters during a visit to Vietnam last month. "Saigon cynics," General William C. Westmoreland, the U. S. commander in Vietnam, says of pessimistic reporters whose accounts of the war habitually differ from those he delivers to the American people.)

Or is it simply, as the cliché has it, that the war *is* complex, and that old touchstones of understanding do not apply?

Television correspondents who have been in Vietnam and the editors in New York responsible for many of the decisions as to what news the networks eventually broadcast are reasonably satisfied with the effort television is making to present comprehensive coverage of the war. Individually at least most are


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

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satisfied that they have contributed to the public's understanding, which perhaps is not surprising. But public attitudes are cited as proof of this contribution. CBS's John Hart recalls that most reporters he knew in Vietnam were discouraged by what they saw—from the "reluctance" of the Vietnamese army to fight, to the difficulties of U. S. officials with the pacification program—and says that he has found the same doubts and fears expressed in the country at large and in both houses of Congress since his return to the U. S. six months ago. "In that respect, the reportage of the war has contributed to some viewers' understanding of it," he says. Even Defense Department officials—although they don't agree that such negative attitudes are a sign that reporting from Vietnam is necessarily perceptive or accurate—say television is providing good coverage.

But there is among the newsmen an undercurrent of dissatisfaction. Some say that massive as television's effort already is in reporting the war and its collateral aspects, its coverage should be enlarged. A check of network and station correspondents currently in Vietnam, or who had been there in the past 18 months, turned up some who thought half-hour news shows should be extended to an hour, that more half-hour and hour-long documentaries should be presented, that more time should be given for "standuppers"—reporters simply standing in front of a camera and explaining and attempting to put an incident in the news into perspective. One also suggested a program that would serve as a "primer" for the public—one that would explain the background and causes of the war, provide a history of the people involved, and, through administration spokesmen, attempt to develop a definition of "victory" in the context in which the conflict is being waged.

A number also spoke of the need for more specialization by correspondents; generally network reporters spend six months to a year in Vietnam (press men generally stay longer), and because of the rigors of the assignment are often young. (Network "name" commentators make repeated, if relatively brief, visits to Vietnam.) Ray Miller, KPRC-TV Houston, who spent the 1966-67 holiday season in Vietnam filming programs featuring Houston men, is among those who feel that the story needs more specialists.

CBS's Mike Wallace has also spoken of the need for TV correspondents willing to spend the time needed "to soak up the background and understanding essential to putting the story in perspective." His colleague, David Schoumacher, suggests the problem may resolve itself as more reporters become immersed in the story; once they do, he says, they want to return—as he does (though with his family, which includes four children). "It's a hell of a story," he says. "You get hooked on it; everything seems to count for so much." He has been moved by the sight of Vietnamese fighting to hold their lives and their families together under the most trying conditions, and of Americans getting killed in large numbers. "Your country is involved, and you want to participate. You want to be there to tell what's going on."

But in a day when battlefield film is seen—thanks to jet planes (and, if necessary, communications-satellite relay from Japan)—less than 24 hours after it is

Pictured on page at left:
(6) Dell Hall of WWL-TV New Orleans; (7) James King, WQAD-TV Moline, Ill.; (8) Jess Cooper (r), KXMB-TV Bismarck, N.D.; (9) Morley Safer of CBS News; (10) Joseph Brechner (with sunglasses), WFTV(TV) Orlando, Fla.

exposed, one problem still troubling correspondents and network brass is technological. They talk of the need for a small, lightweight, sound-on-film camera that can stand up to the heat, moisture, dust and pounding to which it would be subjected in Vietnam. The present heavy-duty camera is the Auricon, which with film and power packs weighs some 35 pounds, and cuts down camera crews' mobility.

There seems to be little interest in proposals for radical innovations in the coverage. At least Michael J. Arlen's suggestion in a recent *New Yorker* piece (the magazines are finding television coverage an important subsidiary vein in their mining of the Vietnam war for news) is treated with contempt, if at all. "Trash," says one correspondent of the Arlen proposal that the networks try to capture the elusive truth of the war through the camera of a gifted movie maker like Michaelangelo Antonioni. And suggestions that television relies too much on combat footage and makes no real effort to place the violence of the war into perspective anger some of the men responsible for producing the product.

Edward N. Fouhy, CBS bureau manager in Saigon, recalls some footage that John Laurence and a CBS crew produced on "a small but brutal fire fight" in which one American was killed. Laurence had reported: "There are a hundred platoons fighting a hundred small battles in nameless hamlets like this every day of the war; they are called fire fights and in the grand strategy of things this fire fight had little meaning for anyone but the red-headed kid who was killed here." Such reporting—which seems to encapsulate much of what the Vietnam war is all about—says Fouhy, "is the best answer I can think of to those know-nothings who are so quick and so uninformed in their eagerness to criticize television's coverage of the war." To Fouhy, such criticism is a "personal insult to the brave men who cover this war under the most trying possible conditions and at great personal risk. . . ." And coverage of the war is risky. At least 17 network newsmen—cameramen and reporters—have been wounded.

Other reporters have made the same kind of effort to place battle pieces into perspective. But some wonder how successful they have been, after viewers have seen, say, olive-drab choppers descending into a landing zone surrounded by lush green jungles and disgorging a platoon of fatigue-clad GI's who engage the enemy in a lively fire fight—machine guns chattering and spurting fire, mortars whumping, wounded soldiers being evacuated—all in color. "I don't know if qualifications get through to the public," says NBC's George Page, who spent 12 months in Vietnam. "I suspect that all they remember is the bang-bang, shoot-em-up."

He recalls doing a filmed report on a battle that he thought might create a dovish attitude on the part of his audience. It was a deadly little fight that served no purpose, and he said so. Yet, he received a letter from a viewer who said that he had been inclined to question U. S. war aims in Vietnam but that, while watching the filmed report, he found himself saying, "Go, Marines. Go." Adding to Page's bewilderment was the fact that it hadn't been the Marines but

Continued on page 56

Pictured on page at right: (11) Tom Capra, KXTV(TV) Sacramento, Calif.; (12) David Snell of ABC News; (13) Bill Leeds (r), WDAF-TV Kansas City, Mo.; (14) Al Austin, WIBW-TV Topeka, Kans.; (15) Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Jack R. Olsen, who monitors television network news programs in Pentagon's TV studio.


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

Technological upheaval in the making

New forms of television recording,
storage and playback could make
a lot of today's hardware obsolete.
Not only that, they promise
to convert the American home into
an exhibition center of vast range.
The race is still in the laboratories,
but CBS is already hard at work
in development of the new markets.
By John Gardiner

Television sits on the edge of a silent revolution. The reverent disciples of Marshall McLuhan and the opposing champions of content in its own right will feel cheated to know they argue in a partial vacuum. TV, considered by some to be its own most important message, isn't even sure these days of its own medium.

Laboratory developments in film recording systems, touching on conjuration, are turning black and white into the splendors of the spectrum and condensing multiple volumes of information onto minireels of celluloid. The witchcraft in the labs is threatening to change the media on which television signals are recorded, stored and replayed and to turn the home into the origination point for a share of the educational and entertainment programing it chooses to receive.

Engineers are wondering what gleaming new machinery may become obsolete before sustaining a scratch, what new investment may soon be required. Major film processing companies with enormous investments in color equipment look furtively over their shoulders, wondering if recent acquisitions will be transformed into premature white elephants, while spending liberally in research and development to make sure they remain in the game even if the rules are changed.

The advance in electronic and optical film recording technologies may reach all the way down to television's basic labor contracts, even as it introduces a home television playback capability and unsettles the world of conventional color film and video tape. Research from Stamford, Conn., to Hollywood has been attended by more secrecy than demonstration. CBS, at the leading edge of film technology, is in an uncomfortable period between announcement and display of an electronic photographic system that might indeed change the mechanical face of television. The engineer's grapevine, as rumor-laden as any other in the broadcasting business, is transmitting messages running from astonished respect for a CBS system that is said to produce remarkably clear color signals to reports that patent difficulties may prevent the company from capitalizing on its lab work.

Meanwhile a small research organization in Burlington, Mass., Technical Operations, operating at much lower visibility, is reported on the verge of success with a related process—though not electronic—that would yield color pictures from black-and-white film, using an optical method. The work is being done for ABC.

Technicolor Inc., enormous film processor and manufacturer of film equipment with facilities around the world, is developing a related system at a research plant on the West Coast, and so, say engineers in the audio-visual research field, is American Systems Inc., a California company.

But CBS has made the most exciting announce-

The film strip at left is artist's
conception of CBS Labs' broadcast
version of electronic video recording.
Nobody outside the labs has seen a
sample, but it's described as a 16 mm
sprocketed material which projects
at six inches per second. Picture
and color information are put on film
electronically, side by side, the
color in the form of analogue bits
and the picture looking like an
ordinary frame of black-and-white
film. The man in strip at left is
the system's inventor, Peter Goldmark.

Broadcast EVR

EVR electron beam recorder takes program from television camera, magnetic tape, or motion picture film to generate an EVR master in color.

Conventional photographic printing processes are used to obtain EVR release prints from conventional 16mm Film.

EVR camera scans conventional 16mm black and white EVR film and transmits a high quality NTSC color signal.



nents and drawn the most publicity and thus lays tself open to the doubters until it lives up to its eviews.

Dr. Peter Goldmark, the cerebral president of CBS Laboratories, doesn't sit completely still to talk about t. He fidgets at the visitor's arrival. He's perhaps vondering why he must suffer another interruption. Already there have been four visits from one reporter or one Sunday supplement story. The news weeklies and the business press have picked at his wealthy brain repeatedly, and the nagging attentions may be getting out of hand.

His conversation is quiet and as measured as the evolution of a 33⅓ RPM phonograph record, whose echnology he fathered. But at times it's as though he s talking to himself, as if he is asking himself more nteresting questions than could be expected from any other quarter. And he keeps jotting notes on a small pad, perhaps the answers.

He is completely absorbed or completely detached by fits and starts. Quick short movements of his head uggest he is darting from subject to subject in quanum jumps, as a water bug on a still surface. No vaking moment is lost for lack of a thought.

This proclaimed wizard of audio-visual communicaions, with splashes of sophistication in business, mareting and promotion, could close his doors permanently now and never risk underexposure. This latest CBS Labs' invention not only seems likely to bring volutionary change in the television industry but bids to provide the first *new* element in that elusive home-communications center of the future.

This time it is a system for condensing, storing and eplaying color television signals. It's a kind of blackand-white magic that means the entire Encyclopaedia Britannica could be stored in color on one and a half even-inch reels of film and sold to homes for oneourteenth the cost of the same volumes in book form. t means that 90,000 frames of information on each even-inch reel would reveal themselves in still, movng, talking or musical color on television screens with he acquisition of a $300 replay attachment that vould unlock their photographic and electronic ecrets. It means that a half-hour color television program, or perhaps the vibrations of the Jefferson Airplane, complete with psychedelic lights, or an orhestra accompanied by a visual symphony after the manner of Disney's "Fantasia," could be sold in carridge form for home replay for between $7 and $14, oughly equivalent to the introductory prices of LP phonograph records, given an inflation factor.

To the television industry it could mean—for the near future—a combination of color fidelity and reproduction economy in program and commercial prints hat could not be resisted. Goldmark says a oneminute color-television commercial could be reproduced for $5 a copy. Alongside the $30 to $35 price for the same job on video tape or approximately $20 on 35 mm film, the new way seems irresistible indeed. The cost looks closer to the $6.50-per-copy charge for 16 mm color film, but with the new method only one print would be required by each user, whereas duplicate commercial prints are commonly distributed in the case of conventional color film.

The new CBS system, called Electronic Video Recording (EVR) affords 35 mm color quality on 16 mm black-and-white film stock. Not only that. The color is fast. "Locked in electronically," is the halfmetaphorical explanation for laymen. It sounds like a slogan for the shine produced by a kitchen floor wax, but this isn't a case of promotional gimmickry. On EVR film there are side-by-side frames, one with luminence information, the other with color information. The luminence frame appears simply as a blackand-white transparency distinguishable by the unaided eye. It requires a photographic developing process. Beside each of these pictures is its own set of coloring instructions that have been placed on the film electronically in analogue format. In its broadcasting application, a special camera costing about $20,000, decodes the color information and, thus instructed, paints the adjacent black-and-white frames electronically, preparatory to their transmission as ordinary color TV signals.

So far CBS has managed to convince most people that its system works and works well, though it has granted no public demonstration of EVR. That won't come until next spring, says Goldmark. Meanwhile, as patents pend, they're not even showing a piece of EVR film. But they're talking about it with convincing assurance.

CBS Labs has brought in Stafford Hopwood, former general manager of international operations of American Viscose Division of FMC Corp., as a business development vice president, wholly as a result of the Labs' EVR development. And although Goldmark prefers to think of his latest achievement as the technology that will help secure the future of educational television, the first group that got a formal audience on EVR from Hopwood was the commercials subcommittee of the broadcast committee of the American Association of Advertising Agencies. They were impressed.

Goldmark is fond of saying that a new medium doesn't replace an old one, but takes a place alongside it. That appropriate reserve may not hold for some applications of EVR. As the medium for TV commercial distribution it might take over completely from film and tape. Gordon Webber, chairman of that 4A subcommittee, who thinks EVR is a "very exciting breakthrough," points out that for an agency, color quality control may be much more important than EVR's attractive cost differential. Agencies can get into terrible hassels with clients and film laboratories


Mr.
Dee-lish
POP
CORN
fresh
crispy
so good
25¢

NOW PLAYING AT YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD MOVIE HOUSE:

THE NETWORKS

WHY ABC AND CBS ARE IN THE PICTURE BUSINESS

BY WALT SPENCER

In Hollywood there's an elevation that is popularly known as Magnetic Hill. It's said that because of some mysterious magnetic attraction an automobile will climb the hill without power, but requires gas on descent. It's an illusion of course, a deception of nature produced by the contrast of two grades.

It just goes to show that in the land of the grand illusion, sometimes it's difficult to tell which way is up. In such a domain of aberrations one pays heed to two laws of survival: (1) to accept seeing as believing is misleading; (2) to accept hearing as believing is suicide.

Nevertheless when ABC and CBS six months ago announced their plans to take guileless plunges into theatrical motion-picture production, old Hollywood hands began seeing whole armadas of cars coasting up hill. Not only that, the hill was the one they were kings of—the studio bosses who had clawed their way to the top through the jungles of movie making.

Illusion and reality often get tangled in the arguments of business competitors. But the economics of the film business suggest that CBS and ABC are far more interested in movies as vehicles for theatrical release than as filler for their own network air. If the networks are to be taken at their word, they simply are moving into a profitable field they are already trained to till and which has more than enough fertile acreage to sustain anyone else who wants to work it in open competition. There is no full financial record established for network-financed movie deals undertaken with theater and TV release as a predetermined release plan. Even the lower-budget TV-first, theater-second movies made by Universal Pictures for NBC have still to run the second half of their course. Seven of them have had their two allotted network runs and have reverted to Universal for theatrical distribution, but none has begun its theater release.

The networks give sound arguments for entering the theatrical movie field: "It's good business," says a CBS spokesman. "Anything to make money," says his counterpart at ABC.

Exploration of the circumstances that have lured two of the big three into feature-film production (NBC maintains it is still studying the possibility), requires a brief examination of the changes that have swept the film business into a drastically different industry during the 25 years that television has been growing up.

The concept of the old-fashioned sprawling Hollywood studio kingdom of many acres, bustling with famous contract stars and lorded over by a cigar-chomping dictator, is as different from the situation today as the open-cockpit airplane is from a jet airliner.

Anyone with money (or a fast enough line of patter to borrow some) can be a movie producer today. The most spectacularly successful of today's motion-picture production companies, United Artists, doesn't own a single sound stage. It is a bankroller-packager-distributor. The company—originally founded in the twenties by several stars, including Charlie Chaplin and Mary Pickford, and now a subsidiary of the Transamerica Co.—was on the verge of extinction during the television boom and movie slump of the early fifties. Then it, and the movie resurgence, suddenly got hot, and the company once again became rich, underwriting independent producers of such films as the James Bond series.

While television production pays many of the bills for that Hollywood studio and back-lot space that hasn't been gobbled up by real-estate developers, the movie business belongs to bankers, promoters, and, particularly, lawyers, because it is primarily a business now of making shrewd individual, and often international, deals.

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TV AND THE MOVIES

from page 41

The president of CBS's newly formed theatrical films division is Gordon Stulberg, who was vice president and chief studio administrative officer for Columbia Pictures, a man whose career has been in theatrical films rather than television. He says: "Almost anyone can move in as an independent production company, but for such things as making prints, buying advertising, lining up stars and full-fledged distribution and promotion you need experience."

This is where both networks claim they have good reason for moving into theatrical production; they are experienced as two of the nation's biggest entertainment media. Says Stulberg: "It is a logical extension of CBS's role in entertainment and communications."

What makes it worth going into is the profit to be mined from movie exhibition: Theater admissions have gone up again in the past four years, not to the level of pretelevision days, but theater admission prices have gone higher, so that theater grosses are now the equal of even the pre-TV days. World box-office revenues of American-produced motion pictures have climbed steadily from $1.1 billion in 1958 to $1.7 billion in 1965.

More leisure time

Says Stulberg: "I think what all the companies have recognized—and I don't mean just CBS and ABC, but others such as Transamerica and Gulf & Western [which now owns both Paramount Pictures and Desilu Productions]— is the growth of the leisure-time area. It's a demonstrated fact that it is a money-maker." In addition to the fact that motion-picture production is easier now than when "the system was much more rigidly structured 15 years ago," Stulberg says it has become more attractive to big businessmen because "it is far less speculative than it was in the past."

Coupled with the increasing profit to be made from film has been a steady decline in product. According to ABC President Leonard Goldenson, there was a 51% drop in the output of distributor-members of the Motion Picture Association of America (162 films in the 1965-66 season, compared with 333 feature films in the 1956-57 season).

A shift in movie-house location has followed that of the general population, to suburbia. The movie theater, like the department store and chain store, has branched out of downtown. In their new locations they generally cater to a young, suburban audience, with more adult pictures at generally higher admission prices in smaller, but plusher, theaters with plenty of nearby parking space.

The grand roccoco downtown Roxies and Bijous that have managed to survive television and the move to the suburbs have tried to do it by showing the super-spectacular "road show" picture, the kind that is worth the effort to go downtown on Saturday night. These are the "My Fair Ladies" and "Camelots" that eventually find their way to the smaller theaters and, presumably, finally to television (like the 1962 $41-million blockbuster, "Cleopatra," now scheduled for ABC in 1971).

Special demand

This has brought a demand for two specialized kinds of film: many more of what used to be considered in old movie parlance the "A" or quality picture with good production values, a solid story and one or more star names, and the super-spectacular. At the same time, all but eliminated is Hollywood's old production staple, the "B" and "C" grind.

No one feels this product demand more acutely than ABC. In addition to being a television network, it owns the largest single theater chain in the country, with 402 houses, worth some $100 million and generating annual earnings of some $10 million, or about 20% of the company's annual profit. ABC maintains it is the need to keep a constant flow of film available to these houses that has moved it into feature-film production.

Company President Goldenson repeatedly has pointed out the continuance of a traditional pattern of movie distribution that concentrates major releases in the prime movie-going summer months and in the Thanksgiving-New Year's holiday period.

ABC's argument is buttressed by the moves of two other companies that more than coincidentally have become tied in, at least on the distribution end, with the ABC and CBS moves. National General Corp.—the country's second largest theater chain with 250 houses—also has gone into feature-film production. Like ABC and CBS, it plans to produce 10 to 12 films a year, already has produced two films under its own imprint (but released through Fox), and is in the process of producing and preparing to release completely on its own now. CBS has entered an agreement with National General to serve as distributor of the CBS-produced films, as well as its own.

Cinerama, with which ABC has joined in a similar distribution agreement, also is participating in production, mostly in conjunction with ABC (they shared equally in financing of two new Cinerama films, "Custer"—no relation to the TV series—and "East of Java").

The National Association of Theater Owners has been so happy to see the entry of new major motion-picture producers that it adopted a formal resolution at its annual convention specifically cheering ABC and CBS for their actions. The NATO president, Sherrill Corwin, even criticized NBC for not joining them.

Why the protest?

What, then, is the objection to the networks' entry into theatrical film making that has kicked up so much public fuss? It is the protest of the old-line Hollywood film makers of the Motion Picture Association, frequently called "The Magnificent Seven"—Columbia Pictures Corp., MGM, 20th Century-Fox Film Corp., MCA Inc. (Universal Pictures), Warner-Bros.-Seven Arts Ltd., Gulf & Western (Paramount) and Transamerica (United Artists).

They contend that for a company owning the means of presentation (theaters for ABC and National General and TV for ABC and CBS) to manufacture product as well is to build a monopoly that violates the spirit and the law established by the antitrust actions of 18 years ago, which caused one of the greatest upheavals in the movie industry. Under those actions, begun in 1948 and effected in 1950, each of the major production companies was forced to divest itself of its theater chains. It is part of an ironic chicken-egg evolution that most of the big studios were founded back in the infant days of the movies by theater chain owners who simply wanted to guarantee themselves a steady supply of prod-

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A

TELEVISION

POLL

QUESTION: HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE PROLIFERATION OF MOVIES ON PRIME-TIME TV?

BY GERALD GARDNER



Series v. movies: new headache for programers



By Caroline Myer

The three network program chiefs have something new to worry about: how to evaluate the new film series when they are up against movies six nights a week and a profusion of specials.

It's an unjust competition, putting the chef and the short-order cook in the same kitchen. Even before the season started, Len Goldberg, vice president in charge of programing at ABC, predicted that "all three networks are going to have a difficult time measuring the success of series against movies or specials. I don't know at what point a show can be considered a success."

Mort Werner, NBC's vice president in charge of programing, asks for more time to judge: "It takes the audience a while to find the new dramatic shows because they are all diverted."

Michael Dann, CBS programing VP, grieves: "It's depressing when you put on a good show, and you face a movie like 'The King and I' and Bob Hope in the same week." It's more than depressing. It's costly. Programing against the sure-fire feature film and the unpredictable special requires more skill and carries a greater risk than the old days when series was pitted against series.

The average so far this season for the 11 new series that begin after 9 p.m. on a movie night is a 25 share. The 13 established series stand a better chance and have averaged a 29. The omnipotent feature film drew a 40 share on the average, beginning the season with a 42 and tapering ever so slightly. If you take that as an index for the whole season, the movies look like a two-hour *Bonanza* six nights a week. The fact of the matter is, however, that features are a very erratic form of programing. They might average a 40 share at the end of the quarter, but the movie ratings are far less consistent than those of a successful series.

The prime-time movies' inconsistency in the ratings is compounded by frontloading—a process by which the best titles are crowded in early in the fall. The ratings indicate that as the lesser titles go on the air the audience tapers off somewhat by mid-season.

The specials can be even a bigger headache. Networks have been known to take a numbers sacrifice on certain news and documentary specials. A well-promoted entertainment special, on the other hand, can not only draw the hard-core viewer away from his favorite series, but also increase the period's normal audience size. NBC's *Chrysler Presents the Bob Hope Show* gained a 42.9 share on Nov. 8 from 9 to 10 p.m.—that's opposite the Wednesday night movie. CBS's *National Geographic Society Special* on Wednesday, Nov. 1 at 7:30, historically a bad slot for specials, drew a 39.4 share.

Then there are the series—the shows that pad out the hours and half-hours around and between movies, the shows that constitute the norm that the specials are a departure from. How do they survive in light of the new competition, and even more interesting, is there a new definition of survival? What new criteria are necessary to evaluate a show scheduled against forms as capricious as specials and as prosperous as films?

With some series there is very little doubt. The fate of *Dundee and the Culhane,* which had to buck the Wednesday night movie, was sealed in two weeks. *Accidental Family,* up against a Friday movie, also suffered an early death. Determining the future of a borderline case in 13 weeks of frontloaded movies and specials is another thing. *He and She,* sandwiched between a variety show and a feature film, was given a reprieve despite disappointing ratings, and was finally renewed. *Mannix,* opposite the Saturday night movie, is waiting for the supply of spectacular feature films to dwindle.

In the first month of the '67-68 season, the three networks had already offered "The Great Escape," "Mutiny on the Bounty,' and "Never on Sunday." What are they saving for the spring? You can bet it's not "Gone With the Wind." A list of specials televised in early September would include *The Miss America*



ligeant, Damn Yankees, and the four-hour *Africa.*

An untried series has a hard time combatting this nd of frontloading. "You don't demand as much because against the movies you know you can't do as well," explains Paul Klein, NBC's vice president in charge of audience measurement. "You hope to attain gh audience levels against weak movies." These ack-of-the-package movies, the 12 or 13 lesser features the package, should be the true measure of the mpeting series, according to Klein. The series is a t if it gets a movie share against the grade-B stuff. 'As the package disappears you can see the numbers ming up," Klein adds.

Specials are not nearly as frontloaded as feature ms and do not have the regularity of a weekly rmat. Once in a while, says Klein, irregular programing can be a help rather than a hindrance in evaluating a series. The death knell rang for *The Second Hundred Years* in mid-November when it ran opposite NBC's special, *Androcles and the Lion.* With *The Beverly Hillbillies* picking up a 46 share on CBS, *Hundred Years* took a paltry 27 share. Ordinarily, *Second Hundred Years* could blame the preempted *Virginian* for its low ratings. When the viewers tuned out the less-than-successful *Androcles,* they tuned in the *Hillbillies,* and *Hundred Years* demonstrated that it couldn't make the grade even against handicapped competition.

There is some debate as to how much time is enough to judge a program's worth. Those who argue that two or three weeks are adequate usually fall into a group that is not easily intimidated by these long, irregular forms of programing. There is certainly an attempt at frontloading by the networks, but networks make mistakes, too. The most unlikely movies get the most unlikely ratings. Witness "Witness for the Prosecution" which pulled in a scandalous 13.6 rating points on its first network run in 1966 and only 10.6 when it was repeated in the summer. An undistinctive western called "The Last Sunset" beat out "The Music Man" by 2.1 rating points. As one agency media man put it: "If the networks were perfect, the first movie of the season would have the highest rating."

The production costs of the competing series do not shrink or alter as the audience shrinks or alters. That a show be self-supporting may be one criterion of success against movies and specials, but television was designed to do more than pay its own way; it is meant to show a profit. The ratings may be lower; the rates may be lower; expectations may even be lower, but costs are constant and must be met by spreading the expense over the whole program schedule. The dead wood is absorbed in the scatter package. Such an advertising package will include a couple of these problem shows in these problem slots, along with a movie buy to sweeten the package, and the price is negotiable. An agency media man sums up his complaint: "The guy who is buying against movies is getting the same cost-per-thousand increase every year as the guy who is buying the movies. And it's usually the same buyer."

This system provides only temporary relief. To be satisfactory over the long haul even the disadvantaged series are going to have to carry their own weight. One solution would be devising low-cost shows to run against the movies. Panel shows such as *The Dating Game* and *The Mating Game,* which have proved themselves successes in prime time, have been suggested. *Accidental Family* with an estimated production cost of $95,000 per episode is being replaced by a quiz show costing only $35,000, *The Hollywood Squares.* The head of the media department of a large TV agency prefers to read that replacement as a trend. Others say it is just a way to round out the year cheaply. Mort Werner, NBC program head, denies planning any such "trend." He vows: "We plan to go after the movies with all we've got."

But movies are not heaven-sent to the programer; they can be, as Klein calls them, "a treadmill to oblivion." As the law of supply and demand dictates,

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uct. It is a further irony that ABC's theater chain (acquired in 1953) is the old Paramount chain of which the studio was forced to rid itself.

Following a strong criticism of the Motion Picture Association's opposition to network film production voiced by ABC's Goldenson (further irony, it was at a dinner of the Motion Picture Pioneers Foundation honoring him as movie pioneer of the year), Motion Picture Association President Jack Valenti rebutted:

"It is not a question of more or less production. It is a matter of fair or unfair competition. Motion picture companies do not oppose production by anybody. We do oppose production-distribution by those who control a large number of theatres and control television networks when motion picture companies are excluded from owning theaters—and networks are entrenched monopolies with whom they must deal to survive. All we ask is that the antitrust laws be applied equally for all, and this is the issue that is the heart of the matter."

No antitrust problem

Both ABC and CBS maintain their legal experts have determined that their moves are not in violation of the antitrust regulations. Both say they could even distribute their own films as well, but have chosen to turn this over to outside agencies (Cinerama and National General) to avoid "any question" of discrimination or favoritism in the sale of pictures. Goldenson claims particular knowledge of the subject since, as a lawyer, he participated both in the drafting of the agreement separating Paramount Theaters from Paramount Pictures and, four years later, in the grafting of Paramount Theaters to ABC.

Nonetheless, the Motion Picture Association has asked the Justice Department to step into the case. The Justice Department, however, says it is waiting for a study, due at any time, that it commissioned almost a year ago to Robert W. Crandall, assistant professor of economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is supposed to be surveying the program-procurement practices of all three networks—including all possible effects of their entry into feature-film making.

The newcomers do have a legal precedent in their favor so far; National General asked for and received court permission to produce films before it entered into movie-making.

One monopoly advantage that opponents claim could arise is the cushion afforded the networks in knowing they can always use one of their films on television if it doesn't make money in theatrical distribution. The regular movie makers, on the other hand, say they are stuck with their flops, which television won't buy.

Less risk with TV

Stulberg acknowledges that while "theatrical display is still primary, much of the risk is now absorbed by the knowledge of television and acquisition and overseas sales."

But, the network executives say, this applies equally to all film makers and it's highly unlikely that any network is going to put a bomb of a movie on and search for advertisers.

Critics say the networks will be able to give free plugs on the air to their movies while in theatrical release. They say the networks also will be able to apply leverage in hiring stars, promising them parts both in movies and on television shows. They also claim that bidding for talent by the networks already has pushed up prices.

In more than two dozen films for which CBS already has signed contracts, it has picked up some of the biggest names in the business, including stars Doris Day, Jack Lemmon and Claudia Cardinale; producers Sam Goldwyn Jr., George Pal and Harold Prince (from Broadway), and directors King Vidor and Howard Hawks.

The terms of Lemmon's four-picture contract drew a chorus of voices from Motion Picture Association companies as being far higher than they could afford to pay. Lemmon's Jalem Productions will get $21 million to make the four pictures for CBS. But Lemmon himself has pointed out that while the production price probably will mean that he will personally receive more for the two pictures he stars in than his former acting price of a $1 million guarantee against 10% of the film's rental he could have gotten "almost as good" a deal from one of the old-line companies (presumably from Warner-Seven Arts, with which he reportedly was negotiating at the time CBS jumped into the scene).

Among the advantages pointed out by Lemmon in making the CBS deal is a lower distribution charge made by the network than any of the old major studios. In breaking down box-office revenue both ABC and CBS are accounting their distribution fees at only 20% as compared to 30% for most of the established studios. The two networks also reportedly are offering better deals on production costs in the areas of overhead and administrative charges.

The amount they differ from old studio charges is untranslatable because most movie contracts are bargained on an individual basis and drafted in a combination of lawyers' jargon, mathematical sleight-of-hand and a touch of black magic that makes them unintelligible even to most of the people involved in them. (It's no coincidence that most of the major studio heads, including CBS's Stulberg, are lawyers).

The producer's share

There are more ways to determine a producer's cut of a studio-backed project than there are methods to fast-deal a poker game. But usually in addition to the studio's charges for physical expenses such as film stock, lighting, etc. it includes "overhead" or administrative charges, or both. The administrative charge, which sometimes can be included in the overhead, presumably is a blanket cover for any work that the unspecified studio personnel had to put in on the project, from the lawyer who drafted the contract to a secretary in New York who addressed critics' invitations to a screening.

The overhead usually is blanket rental for all the nonitemized costs involved in use of sound stages, lighting, etc. At the big studios this overhead charge normally runs between 20% and 30%. A company such as United Artists (and ABC), which has no studio space, of course, does not charge this overhead; only the administrative fee.

Stulberg acknowledges that on comparable contracts the networks are probably charging less than the d-line studios, both for overhead ıd administrative fees and for dis- bution. He maintains that it can done simply by being more care- l and efficient; that studios for ars have gotten away with charg- g high blanket overhead fees, r example, and not particularly orrying whether sound stages that being paid for are sitting idle being used with maximum effi- ncy.

How will ABC and CBS go but their feature-film making? In host as many ways as there are of oducing films. One major differ- ce between their two operations hat CBS will, in many instances, ovide its own physical facilities shooting, particularly on the l seven-acre Republic Studios lot North Hollywood, which it ught almost a year ago for $9.5 llion.

t a studio

ABC, on the other hand, will not a movie studio in the old- hioned sense of maintaining big oduction facilities. Samuel H. ırk, ABC group vice president in rge of all nonbroadcast activity, s: "We like to think that we're United Artists, with one excep- n—they distribute their own pic- es, but we won't. We will not intain studios, but we will not just a banking outfit, either. In ny instances, properties will be ected by us and producers as- ned. At the same time, we will entering into agreements with lividual producers such as Bob lrich [producer-director of such ns as 'Whatever Happened to by Jane' who owns his own Asso- ites and Aldrich Company]."

For its production, ABC has set two special subcompanies, Palo- r Pictures International and Sel- r Picture Productions Inc. (the ter a spin-off of its television oduction company, Selmur Pro- ctions Inc.).

Despite the official antagonism own toward the networks' entry to feature production by the Mo- n Picture Association members, y all are occupying the same d and if legal action is not exact- of the "friendly lawsuit" variety, does not halt mutual business ntures.

Says ABC's Clark: "If a producer director or big star has an agree- ent with another company, we'll with them." Paramount and BC already are involved in joint ancing of at least two pictures ramount is distributing even ile the Justice Department sup- osedly is pondering the protest of Paramount and its six fellow studi- os against ABC and CBS. The first of the ABC-Paramount films— "Smashing Times" with Rita Tushingham and Lynn Redgrave— already is playing around the coun- try. Both it and the forthcoming "Diamonds for Breakfast," with Miss Tushingham again and Mar- cello Mastroianni, are really three- way arrangements typical of the mutual participation of film- makers. They are international projects really produced by Carlo Ponti (the Italian picture- packaging husband of star Sophia Loren), but financed and split up on a territorial deal called, in the terminology of the business, a "ne- gative pick-up." Under this sort of arrangement, Paramount, in this case, went to ABC and said it was underwriting part of the picture in return for some distribution rights and ABC could join in for X num- ber of dollars and in return would be given, for example, the U.S., Canadian and television rights to the picture.

That is one popular type of ar- rangement. At the other end, again typified by ABC, is the true pro- duction of an upcoming film on what is known as a "step deal" in the case of "For the Love of Ivy," a picture that will star Sidney Poi- tier from an original idea of his. (Super stars such as Poitier and Lemmon usually sign deals in which they participate directly in the profits of a picture, above a guaranteed minimum, rather than just being paid a flat talent fee.)

Hot box office

"Poitier is now the hottest box office star in the business," said Clark. "His agent began talking about an idea that Sid had, so we said: 'Sid, let's develop it into a screenplay.' We commissioned the writing of a tentative script that may have cost us an investment of $30,000 to $40,000. It might not have been worth going any further, but in this case, the first draft con- vinced us that this was something we should go ahead with." ABC then proceeded to put together the film package.

Thus, the word "production" in the sense of theatrical films can run from simply being a backer to a real producer who packages a whole picture, from selecting a script idea and designating stars, personnel and studio space right down to the actual distribution.

And the word production in no way is restricted to shooting on a Hollywood lot. Among the loca- tions where ABC's Selmur and Pal- omar companies are currently in- volved in production projects are Boston, New York, London, Rome, Norway, Mexico and the Far East.

CBS's schedule is similar. Ex- plains CBS boss Stulberg: "One of the major factors in making the- atrical film production less specula- tive in recent years has been the overseas production where some governments ease the financial bur- den by providing grants or sub- sidies to actually underwrite part of the cost of the film [as Great Britain does under its Early Plan]."

What happens to a picture once it is in the can and ready to be released to the public?

This is the point where the Mo- tion Picture Association members become upset with the networks and National General. It's also the point where the first money is to be made from a film, since the dis- tribution costs always are taken di- rectly off the top of the box-office receipts and before the producer begins to get back any of his invest- ment in the production, or "nega- tive cost" of the film.

Similarities

Also, up to this point, the net- works are not that much different from some of the major studios. For example, Gulf & Western is as much involved in similar stages of production as either of the net- works: It owns not only Paramount Studios for movies, but Desilu with its mammoth studio ownership and television production, plus it has 51% of Famous Players Corp., which, with 308 movie houses, is the largest theater chain in Canada.

The reason for the Justice De- partment's antitrust action against the motion-picture production- theater chains in the late '40s was the complaints of smaller chain and individual theater owners against "block booking," in which a movie producer would virtually dictate exactly where and when pictures would play. Smaller theater owners were blocked out of the chance to bid for a first-run movie.

ABC, CBS and National General say they will avoid any hint of a return to this monopolistic practice by making their pictures available to the highest bidder, regardless of who it is, in both theatrical dis- tribution and eventual television sales. As pictures are now sold, there are about a dozen major na- tional distribution companies, each with about 24 to 30 film exchanges scattered at strategic locations

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across the country.

The film company usually sets the schedule for opening of the picture in various parts of the country (a "Ma and Pa Kettle"-type comedy in the South, Midwest and rural areas first, for example; an arty or intellectual film such as "The Pawnbroker" in New York for the reviews, followed by other big cities and, eventually, the sticks). It also plans the advertising and promotion campaigns for the picture. Its distribution outlet goes into individual areas and begins dickering with local movie houses or chains to see who can get the best deal.

There are two more common methods for bargaining: One is the simple percentage break in which the distributor may take something like 60% of the theater box office and the theater the other 40%. Or, in the case of very expensive or highly popular pictures, the theater owner will get a flat rate for his operating expenses deducted and everything above that is split on a ratio as high as 90% to the distributor and 10% to the theater owner. It's all a matter of each distributor and theater owner bargaining for the best deal he can get.

Regional autonomy

Even ABC, with its chain of 400 theaters, lets the regional units operate autonomously. Says ABC's Clark: "Our theater group is broken down into 15 affiliated circuits, each with its own film buyer. One man, such as the head of our Balaban & Katz circuit around Chicago, may call up a rival theater owner or even someone from another part of our chain, such as Texas, to ask how a picture he is thinking of bidding on may be doing. But it's a professional courtesy, not a matter of consultation.

"We lose a lot of pictures because we don't have a 400-theater buy, but we feel the people on the local scene have more of a feel for the local situation." Nor, says Clark, will the theater chain heads be given a major say in deciding what sort of product ABC turns out in the way of feature motion pictures.

Already, Clark says, ABC theaters have lost a picture in which the network had a financial investment because of a better offer from a rival. "My San Francisco man wanted 'Smashing Times' so bad he could taste it," said Clark, "but it was sold away from him because Paramount got a better play date—Christmas time—from a competitor."

Under the distribution arrangement, Cinerama is setting up 13 branches across the country to distribute its and ABC's films. CBS has its own sales manager, who will determine the distribution pattern, with National General handling only the physical details of sales and distribution.

Strangely, National General is charging a 30% fee for distributing its own pictures but CBS is charging only 20% for its pictures, even though they are also being released through National General (which in turn receives from 10% to 15% from CBS).

A dozen a year

The plan of both networks, when at full production, is to produce from 10 to 12 pictures each year, with an average budget of $2.5 million to $3 million per picture. The rule of thumb in the industry is that a picture must make back a little more than two and a half times its negative cost before it starts paying off for the producer at the box office.

ABC will put aside about $30 million, exclusive of the two Cinerama pictures, for its first year's investment in film making. One network executive sees it as a sort of revolving fund. "As we start getting returns from the box office, we'll put it back into pictures." If the project is a success, the amount of the fund could go up, he says.

ABC Vice President Clark, although acknowledging that at this point "we're not yet at full speed or full complement," looks to a schedule in the near future where "once we really get rolling, I'd like to think of two road show pictures and 10 or 12 in a general release category each year. Of these 10 or 12, four to six would fall into what we'd call the 'A' category—and that's not measured by the budget.

"Our investment will depend on our estimation of the gross for each picture. We'll be influenced by the property and the elements being put in to its production. I don't think budgets are going to influence the type of picture we make. We're talking about making 'The Birthday Party' from the Harold Pinter play in Rome with Robe[rt] Shaw. This picture makes sense [at] $650,000. It wouldn't at $3 mi[l]lion."

There is little mention of telev[i]sion made in the breakdown of th[e] network's theatrical film produc[]tion; this is because the networ[k] executives say these new division[s] are strictly theatrical motion-pi[c]ture operations and the only con[]siderations given to television ar[e] as a tertiary and somewhat remot[e] source of income (after the pri[]mary and secondary ones of domes[]tic and foreign theater grosses).

Their actions thus far suppor[t] these contentions. They point ou[t] that there is no connection with the feature films made for televi[]sion by Universal for NBC' "World Premiere" series or the contract announced last month be[]tween Universal and CBS for the film studio to produce up to six two-hour films at a cost of $1 mil[]lion to $1.25 million each for showing on television before sale to theaters.

Says a CBS executive: "That sor[t] of thing is strictly a television dea[l] with low-budget filming. It has no relation at all to feature-film mak[]ing by us."

No TV men

Almost all of the personne[l] brought in to the new film-making divisions have been hired away from other movie companies. Prac[]tically none of them have had any[]thing to do with television (CBS' two top sales managers came from Paramount and MGM. The execu[]tives hired to head the ABC Cinerama regional sales offices came from Warner-Seven Arts Fox, United Artists, Universal and Buena Vista [Walt Disney]. Its head is a former Fox executive Seymour Poe.)

Both networks contend tha[t] eventual television sales—including the dwindling library of feature films for use on television—play no part in the selection of film projects.

As an example, ABC's Clar[k] cites "Candy," from the long banned Terry Southern-Mason Hoffenberg parody of pornograph[]ic novels. "We're making it in Rome with Richard Burton, Mar[]lon Brando and Ringo Starr," say[s] Clark. "We never ever would con[]sider this for TV. On the whole though, if a film has somethin[g] that makes it salable to TV afte[r]

'e've wrung the last theatrical dol-
lr out of it, we'll be there. We're
tying to make the kind of pictures
hat will succeed at the box office;
en they'll be that much more
ccessful for TV."

Says CBS's Stulberg: "While tele-
sion sales are growing, the actual
come for our pictures comes
it of theatrical release. Maybe
ere will be an isolated picture
here eventual television sales
ill make the difference between
ofit and loss, but you have to
an on making your investment
it of theatrical distribution."

One of the more common rules
thumb in the movie business has
en to expect to write off some
% of a film's cost in the first six
onths of distribution, 85% within
e first year and 102% within two
ars, with anything made after
at in TV sales as gravy. However,
ithin the past three or four years
me of the studios have begun to
odify their amortization sched-
es to include eventual TV sales as
planned 2% or more of the pic-
re's income.

mestic-foreign earnings

Theatrical distribution, when
nsidering a potential picture, de-
nds much more on attempting to
imate the domestic and overseas
dience for it. Feature films these
ys, on the average, make just
der half their income from U.S.
owing and the rest overseas, al-
ough Stulberg notes, "this varies
th the type of picture. Action
d war films make far more
road, while such things as come-
es make 60% to 70% of their
oney here."

When it comes time to sell net-
ork-made films for television,
oth ABC and CBS say they will
it them on the open market for
qual bidding by their competitors.
f the other networks don't bid on
ir pictures, we're in real trouble,"
ys Stulberg.

What will it mean to television
d to the network film-making
ivisions? It is difficult to estimate
this time. The gobbling up of
ollywood movie libraries has
een widely publicized: just about
very pre-1948 movie except "Gone
Vith the Wind" has been sold to
elevision, 70% of the post-1948's
ave been sold, too, with the esti-
nate that everything will be gone
y early in the next decade, as the
etworks already are showing six
rime-time feature films a week
nd would surprise no one to go to
even next fall. That means some
50-160 new movies a year needed
or television—slightly more than the number of movies suitable for television use now annually being turned out by the studios. The situation is even more difficult in syndication, where the Broadcast Information Bureau counts a roller-coaster drop in the number of previously-unused films available: 669 in 1966 as against more than twice that many, 1,505, in 1965, and with under 200 pictures reportedly available for fresh syndication as the new year starts.

Yet if ABC, CBS and National General hold to their announced plans for feature film output, altogether they will add only some three-dozen new films per year, hardly enough to either replenish the quickly-disappearing film libraries or to drive back down the galloping escalation of movie prices to the networks.

With the networks bidding up feature film prices to heights that would have been frightening a few seasons ago (CBS's $800,000-per-picture average in its package buy from MGM; ABC's record $5-million buy of "Cleopatra" from 20th Century-Fox for two showings), no network executive will even attempt to guess what his feature films could be worth when they come around for network sales in a minimum of two to three years, much less what they'll be worth in syndication.

"No one can estimate at this point where things will go," says one network man. "Will the ratings for prime-time movies hold up? Will the advertisers keep paying the rates necessary to keep bidding higher for good pictures?"

The long-range impact of ABC and CBS on film making in terms of monopoly practices, can only be judged on actual future performance.

The short-range impact comes from the increased competition of two experienced giant corporations ready to use all their deal-making shrewdness and business and technological efficiency to cash in on a lucrative field.

(Although CBS says it plans no technical tinkering with accepted movie-making methods, an ABC executive already is talking about the fact that "motion pictures shouldn't be afraid of trying technological innovations that have come out of TV).

Can the CBS eye outshine Columbia's torch? Will the NBC peacock some day assault MGM's Leo the Lion? You'll probably have to go to your neighborhood movie house to find out in the next exciting installment. END

A TELEVISION ENCOUNTER

ARE UHF'S BEING SHORT CHANGED BY THE RATING SERVICES?

DAVID A. TRAYLOR
vice president-regional manager
A. C. Nielsen Co., New York

The heart of the question would seem to be this: Are the local television measurement services, such as NSI, *under*-reporting UHF? In general, we don't think so.

Basically, we have outlined five primary factors as guidelines in evaluating UHF audiences: (1) the number of households with sets and antennas capable of receiving satisfactory signals from one or more UHF stations; (2) the extent of established VHF competition in the market; (3) the extent to which the UHF station offers programs that attract mass audiences; (4) the extent to which the strength of the UHF signal is competitive with others in the area; (5) the length of time UHF has been operating locally.

One of several ways in which we have examined UHF trends is on our Nielsen Television Index national sample. Ownership of UHF-equipped sets increased more than two-and-a-half times from June 1965 to June 1967; also there are many more UHF stations for the new UHF set owners to view. UHF households in the sample were listed as 17% in June 1965; 29% in June 1966, and 43% in June 1967. Yet the corresponding UHF share of total TV viewing hours rose relatively little—in those three periods from 4.0% to 4.7% and again 4.7%. And for similar annual periods in those three years, the UHF viewing share in Nielsen Station Index reports moved only from 4.5% to 5.0% and then 5.5%.

Why? Let's look at another dimension of the problem—this on a local market basis, where NSI provides some "can and do" UHF estimates:

	UHF markets	*Percent metro households tuning to the leading UHF station one or more times per week** *March 1965*	*February 1966*	*Feb/Mar 1967*
Markets illustrative of situations with 3 or more VHF'S with network affiliation	Boston	3	8	20
	Chicago	—	9	16
	Detroit	10	26	38
	Los Angeles	4	5	6
	New York	—	2	3
	Philadelphia	—	26	35
	Washington	5	6	27
Markets illustrative of all UHF situations, each having 3 U's affiliated with nets	Fresno	97	95	94
	Peoria	97	97	95
	South Bend	97	96	94

* *The figures are NSI estimates during the average week of the measurement interval. In the event of statistical ties, one station was selected.*

Here we are no longer talking about UHF *ownership*, but actual metro viewing of the leading UHF station, at least once a week. Weekly circulation for UHF stations in all-UHF markets was close to 100% years ago. In the established VHF markets,

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JHF stations in mixed markets, independents and network ffiliates alike, suffer from an absolute and relative understate-ıent of their audience by current syndicated diary research. The roblem is further accentuated by the recent boom in UHF roadcasting, which renders intolerable the previously excused ıadequacies of research.

Diary surveys have continually overstated network programing t the expense of independent broadcasters. In fact, a test survey ı the New York market showed an average independent share) be over 50% higher on two meter services than in either of ıeir corresponding diary studies.

The causes of this predictable bias are inherent in the method-logy of the diary survey, the accuracy of which depends totally n the awareness and faithfulness of household diary keepers.

Although theoretically intended as a coincidental method, the iary is, in practice, prepared from recall. The resultant memory rror emerges as the major cause of the difference between actual ewing habits and those reported by the syndicated diary.

Recall error, apart from its innate deficiency, is also a product f several factors. Inattention generally contributes to the under-atement of daytime and late-night viewing. Guilt feelings on ie part of the housewife, from perhaps watching too much levision, or more than her husband might approve of or than ie might rationally approve of herself, are another key cause of aytime understatement.

Diary-keeping fatigue, which intensifies as the week progresses, as a significant impact on late-in-the-week understatements and ıaccuracies.

Ratings for the entire diary week are adversely affected by the commended head diary keeper system, which is an especial ilure in multiple-set households. As it is sometimes impossible o know what is being watched on all sets, the head diary keeper nintentionally understates second set and preschool viewing.

In addition to the variety of recall errors, ethnic and Spanish-nguage stations are plagued by placement bias, since the mples are drawn from total telephone directories, which have a igher telephone penetration among the general population ıan they do among minority groups. Consequently, not enough iaries are placed among ethnic groups to draw meaningful atistical results.

The "in-depth telephone coincidental" has proved to be the oundest alternative technique for low share and UHF stations. t offers a cooperation rate of over 95% compared to the diary's ss than 50% and when used in conjunction with ethnic lacement controls, the telephone coincidental is an excellent panish programing measurement technique.

The recall bias and the diary fatigue factor are also elimi-ated. The guilt feelings from watching a lot or reporting a lot f television viewing are greatly reduced, and the oversight—ıissed entries when the diary keeper is away—is nonexistent.

The telephone coincidental is by no means new. We've had it for

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ALBERT B. PETGEN
president, Med-Mark Inc.
New York

SPOT'S FAT PLATEAU

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to fight among themselves in behalf of their stations. This can be contrasted to the practices of national magazines, which exercise whatever influence they can at the highest client levels, which spend a good deal of money in promotion and advertising and which are decidedly competitive toward other media (see the recent *Good Housekeeping* campaign matching that magazine against all of television).

Many reps have recognized the problem, and they are behind the Television Bureau of Advertising's latest push to explain and sell spot television directly to clients. Television Advertising Representatives, utilizing the talents of Bob Hoffman, vice president and research director, and Arma Andon, special projects manager, has been working on and with specific advertisers for years. Blair Television recently set up a new-business operation and appointed Mel Goldberg, vice president, research, as its head. There have been other attempts (the famous CBS Stations Division "apples and oranges" presentation, the Katz Agency's tour of major cities last year, Edward Petry & Co.'s trade campaign) but little in the way of sustained drives.

TVB's role

The feeling among many sales representatives is that no one firm can do it all, hence the TVB effort. Jack White, of H-R Representatives, who has been working closely with the bureau, thinks that in addition his own salesmen should have contacts with clients. Also, he thinks that stations can apply pressure on clients from below—"on the regional guys, the bottler, the distributor."

But the big effort this year is being led by TVB, which is sending teams comprising its own people and station reps to as many advertisers as possible. "We've already hit over 200 advertisers that account for 55% of the money invested in network, spot, magazines and newspapers," says a TVB official. "I know we've hit pay dirt—some of them have actually asked us for media plans."

The bureau people have also found a good deal of confusion as to what spot is all about and what it can do. Some people in the rep field hint darkly that the advertising agencies deliberately keep clients that way. They say that because spot is complicated, it is more costly to buy than network, hence less profitable to an agency. Therefore, it was cautiously suggested, agencies tend not to recommend spot when they can build a story for network.

Is this a problem for spot television, several agency media executives were asked? Among the more printable reactions was that of Bates's Justin Gerstle:

"A smart agency can't afford to take that attitude. As the client's sales go up, the agency gets more income. After all, 15% of more is more. They'd be cutting their own throats to go to one medium to save a few dollars."

Says Y&R's Warren Bahr: "In the main, agencies are given money to spend for a brand, money that is fixed on case movement. Where agencies make their money is in moving cases. Besides, media is only about 3% of the 15%. And the difference between buying spot and a complicated network scatter plan is only about 1% today. The trouble with that whole theory is that it assumes the client is stupid. That's always a very dangerous assumption to make."

If that is not a problem, then what are spot's problems? Bahr thinks that one of the medium's newest difficulties is the elimination of discounts by the networks. "When the networks got rid of discounts they made TV more of a commodity—like the wheat market, it was priced on a commodity scale and as such had to reflect the market much more quickly. And as a commodity it's just as perishable for spot as it is for network." Bahr implies the networks understand and price on this theory; spot people do not.

Few recommendations

Advertising agency executives generally aren't too concerned with what they consider a temporary setback in a medium that has been usually lucrative. ("It's hard," said one, "to get all upset when somebody's net to gross falls from 38% to 36%.") Recommendations as to what can be done are therefore few and far between.

One of the more far-reaching ones comes from a media specialist at one of the nation's largest television agencies. "I feel very strongly that stations are tied down by history in terms of what the structure of their rate cards should be. It used to be that the minute was the base unit of time, something that was inherited from radio. But selling ought to be related to what the market wants. Now if national advertisers have indeed rejected 10's and 20's and also the minute length, and appear to prefer 30's, why shouldn't the station manager look at his rate card and build a new one based on 30 seconds as the main unit of time?

"I know it's not simple, but it's got to come and the only question is when. This agency will insist on 50% of the minute rate for a 30 second. But if stations start from here and find more 30-second locations they'll be able to increase their gross and sell all over the place."

In Warren Bahr's opinion, stations "are going to have to be more flexible in their pricing policies, more flexible in their over-all way of doing business, more flexible in the units that are used."

High-cost cut-ins

One thing that stations can do to help themselves, says the Y&R media executive, "is do something about competitive advertising. I know they blame it on the network but my client doesn't think I'm doing the best job in the world when he sees his message close to the competition's. And another thing: they've priced the costs of cut-ins at a fantastic rate."

Concludes Bahr: "They're going to have to make it a more attractive marketplace for the national advertiser to go to—cleaner, better, with more variety. There are still a lot of dirty corners in this business. What do I mean? Ask any rep."

Another agency man suggests making a special season out of the January-February period when viewing levels are at their highest but volume has fallen drastically. He points to a special Harrington, Righter & Parsons study that notes that advertisers tend to hold up on their spending at year's end—some out of habit, some because new budgets haven't been set. January thus becomes a truly desolate month in terms of spot volume. Meanwhile, TV viewing is nearing its highest levels and people continue to buy food, soap, drugs, tobacco. The HR&P presentation suggests that spot TV advertisers could take advantage of this seaal lull and obtain choice availa-ties at the year's lowest cost-per-usand.

Why not package this concept promote it to national adver-rs?" asks the media man. "It ıld help the agencies too."

Iany agencies and sales rep-ntatives (especially those with estments in computers) think t one of spot's more pressing blems—its complexity—will be ed by electronic data process- and, ultimately, by a unified, ıdardized system (see TELE-ON, November 1966). The Katz ncy and H-R Representatives two reps that are very strong this point.

Vith a better-informed and ear--sold advertiser that can use the dium relatively effortlessly, it ıld seem as though the worst of ional spot's problems could be r within a matter of a few years. t at least two problems remain. e is that there are three net-rks out there, and talk of a rth, that are in direct, daily npetition for the national and netimes regional television dol- Another is: What will happen stations in markets below the -30 level if the present trend to ıcentration of spot volume in biggest markets continues?

lated questions

The two questions—network npetition and the smaller mar-s—are related. It is now adver-r and advertising agency philos-ıy that if you've got a network e you've got national coverage l so you need only worry about ır problem areas, e.g., the big rkets where sales tend to bulk. is is probably the best explana-ı of why national spot dollars tending to go into the big mar-s to the detriment of almost all er markets. The thinking is, l it certainly can be challenged, t a network buy gives adequate erage in the smaller markets; v how do we get national spot ıelp in the biggest ones?

pot television representatives l concede: Because of their big ups, you can buy more stations less cost on the networks than ı can in spot.

But the point about spot is that ı can be selective and the point t smaller markets (about 70 of m would be in the top 100) parently must make to national l regional advertisers is that h market is a peculiarity unto lf, with its own problems, its n sales potential. END

FOCUS ON COMMERCIALS

1) "Kids" opens on dark alley. Music: rock.
2) Cut to car on street. Group surveys it.
3) Ringleader: "They tell me this Javelin's priced lower than the other sporty cars. Well, I know my cars, and ya woulda fooled me, ya know."
4) Leader: "I mean, take them bumpers." Another kid tries to pull off bumper. Leader: "Not now, stupid!"
5) The leader runs down the Javelin's selling points. He gestures to the windows: "And these no-vent windows . . . that's solid glass."
6) Leather-jacketed kid with transistor radio laughs: "Hey, lotsa glass, lotsa class!"
7) Leader squelches insubordination.
8) Leader points to hood of car, snaps fingers: "Hey, Hood, da hood."
9) With hood up, Hood reads off stastistics: "232 cube hot six pack, seven main bearing crank, all syncromesh gear box . . . Hey that's a car."
10) Leader slaps gang member playfully. Leader: "The back seat's roomier, the front's roomier. It'll hold the gang."
11) "So, in conclusion, I can honestly say that this new Javelin's got everything we look for in a car."
12) Heavy man in T-shirt appears on brownstone stoop: "Hey punks . . . Get away from that car!" Kids back away.

Testimonial from six young hoods sells Javelin auto

American Motors has put an abbreviated "West Side Story" to work selling cars. The commercial, assembled by Wells, Rich & Greene, is the endorsement of a product by a team of experts. The product is the Javelin; the experts look as if they were just sprung from a reform school. Up to no apparent good, five boys case the car, and in the process (lucky for the client) enumerate the Javelin's selling features, point by point.

Some heat has been generated by this commercial, and WR&G has alienated not a few mothers. "These kids seem to create a fear," Al Wolfe, account supervisor, explains, "one, because they don't want their kids to emulate them, and, two, because these kids are an ominous threat." Copywriter Charlie Moss dismisses the complaints of concerned mothers: "That commercial is probably as inoffensive as anything on television. It doesn't create the problem. The problem is there." As Moss sees it, the Javelin spot does no more to encourage crime than does the programing it interrupts. It is, he explains, just one minute out of five hours of prime time preoccupied with violence.

Neither agency nor client seems too concerned with these signs of unrest among viewers. Almost every letter denouncing the commercial comes from a woman between the ages of 35 and 45. That's not the sports-car market. Wolfe calls the Javelin a "young family car," a "sports-type car." The sports-car market, says Wolfe, is under 35 and is a hip community. He hopes that while the commercial displeases some older people, it will turn on other, younger people. American Motors claims a drop in the average age of the buyer of the American Motors car from 41 to 29 years since the introduction of the 1968 line at the end of September. The creators of this commercial believe that the testimonial of a half-dozen hoodlums is doing the job. You don't *say* 'this is a young car'. You demonstrate it," according to Moss. "Our approach to this thing is a spoof." Little wonder women complained; the television medium has never been famous for embracing satire.

AMC wanted to horn in on the growing sports-car market when it eveloped the Javelin. Before Vells, Rich & Greene took over the ccount, the sports car constituted 8% of the total automobile mar- t, and Ford's Mustang had am- assed half of those sales. But nerican Motors had a problem th its image. The company was nsidered stodgy, conservative— ything but youthful.

WR&G claims to have changed that, and it has run tests to ove it. Gallup & Robinson mea- red recall in a test given 24 hours er viewing. American Motors ored 23%, 25%, and 27% audi- ce recall in three different tests. ith the median score standing ly at 11%, the agency is proud of ese numbers.

Internal measurements were ide on those who saw the com- rcials. Wolfe estimates that the rcentage of people who reacted sitively to the product sale was . The high results so surprised Gallup people that they reran tests twice to confirm the num- rs.

A yardstick of commercial effec- ieness that only an insider can preciate is dealer response. Ac- rding to Wolfe, an automobile aler is a tough man to please, t one California dealer was im- essed enough with the commer- l to send two dozen roses to R&G President Mary Wells.

American Motors has reported bstantial sales increases since ells, Rich & Greene took over its vertising. October 1967 was up % over October 1966. November 67 was ahead 15%.

"Kids", as the commercial is lled, is the second spot WR&G s created for the Javelin. The st shows a group of workmen ecking a car that looks suspi- ously like a Mustang. "We started th the 'Wreck' commercial be- cuse we were taking the Mustang ad-on, and we wanted to make e product points individually," olfe says. The agency expects to ase out the "Wreck" in the first arter of 1968, but "Kids" will ntinue indefinitely. The next mmercial planned for Javelin ill demonstrate performance and es into production early in 1968.

The "Kids" commercial was pro- uced only in a one-minute ver- on. Wolfe explains: "We've got uite a story to tell, and we want to ll it completely, rather than just et a name registration. It's a sale- -depth, really."

The art director at Wells, Rich & reene responsible for "Kids" is tan Dragoti. Production costs on this one commercial totaled $60,-000, and it was filmed in California on a Warner Brothers set by Howard Zieff. The music was created by Grant Murtaugh, and there is rumor of a record release in the works. END

Budgets, like rules, are made to be broken

by Granger Tripp

This is the season for fearless predictions, and here are a few that come with a money-back guarantee:

The new year will still be young when an account man tells a writ- er: "Look, this commercial has got to be great. Really imaginative. Different. Persuasive. Memorable. We've got to blaze new trails. Go all out. But, uh, while you're at it, we're a little over budget, so could you think of a great idea that won't cost too much?"

The year will not be much older when a client hears his agency rep- resentative explain: "Yes, sir, I know it's more than we planned, but the creative group feel they have something very unusual here, and if we could just have a few more thousand. . ."

And the season will scarcely be under way when a film-company representative moves the telephone receiver a few inches from his ear, the better not to hear: "You say your bid is WHAT. . .?"

Like every other year, 1968 will be a time commercials cost just a little more to produce than we really thought they would.

By tradition, of course, costs have been the province of the agency producer. It is he who has understood the subsections of the Screen Actors Guild code, the re- quirements of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Em- ployes and the bidding proclivities of the various production houses.

But today, costs are too impor- tant for anyone in our business to toss aside. Everyone has to be knowledgeable in this area, or the whole medium will suffer.

In general, there are two kinds of reasons for growing price tags. One set of reasons involves such things as higher salaries, and the higher costs of materials and facili- ties. The switch to color, for exam- ple, is said to add about 15% to 20% to a TV commercial's cost.

But even more important, it seems to me, are the growing pres- sures on the people who write and produce commercials; the growing competition for the viewer's atten- tion; the increasing importance of the TV commercial in the over-all marketing strategy; and the wear- ing-out of many tried-and-true (and relatively inexpensive) com- mercial techniques.

The result is a new willingness to go anywhere, do anything, to make the commercial work and, inevitably, growing budgets.

Whatever the reason, rising costs bring new responsibilities to every- one—new obligations for our own success and for the success of com- mercial TV as an advertising medium.

What should be our attitude in the face of these growing costs and pressures? "That's for the book- keepers. I'm creative," will hardly do. Neither will: "Hang the ex- pense, let the client pay!" We must, instead, go for the big idea, spend what it takes to do the job— but, do it in a professional way, without waste or confusion. We must, as Matt Harlib, creative su- pervisor and TV producer at JWT, says, "put our money on the screen."

Every writer or art director will review his script or storyboard a dozen times before he's finished with it. At least one of those read- ings ought to be for cost. Without sacrificing anything that seems in any way helpful, he ought to ask himself a number of pertinent questions:

How many set-ups have I called for? Have I needlessly mixed inte- riors and exteriors, when one or the other would do better?

How many principal actors are involved? Can some of them be extras?

How about travel expense? Is location sound essential?

How complicated are the sug- gested opticals? (The cost itself may not be great, but a tricky optical may have to be tried several times, and as your airdate ap- proaches, it could prove to be a problem.)

It's interesting to note how many such questions—raised in the inter- ests of economy—should be asked anyway for the sake of improving a commercial's effectiveness. As Sel Shillinglaw, JWT commercial-pro- duction estimator, put it, in a re- cent study of TV commercial costs prepared for J. Walter Thompson: "Simplicity, because it demands ex-

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Tripp is VP-creative supervisor at J. Walter Thompson, New York.

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troops of the First Infantry division that had been engaged.

Page is one of those who feels correspondents should be given the opportunity to do more standuppers as a means of affording the public a clearer picture of the situation. But not all correspondents are enthusiastic about that approach either. ABC's Ted Koppel, a recent returnee, says obtaining appropriate film would be a problem—"and anyway, standuppers of this kind tend to look rather pompous unless you're an Edward P. Morgan or an Eric Sevareid." And NBC's Frank McGee, who has done a considerable amount of analysis and interpreting of the war, says: "Sure, there could be more interpretation. . . . But then you'll get the views of the commentator. If you favor the war, you'll like a commentator who favors the war."

In providing combat scenes, the men in the field and their editors in New York are meeting what they regard as the demands of their medium and of their craft. They feel they can't overlook the fact that the end product of television is pictures—and that combat makes a compelling picture. "The sensationalism in Vietnam is obviously the combat," says one reporter still there covering it. "Editors want combat footage. They will give it good play."

After all, the television news producer's choice as to the kind and variety of news he will present from Vietnam is limited by the time of broadcast he is given. A newspaper editor may have 50 or 60 or 90 pages in which to fit his stories—of urban unrest, of the devaluation of the pound, of the goings-on of a Congress heading into a presidential election year—but the producer of a television news show has the equivalent of perhaps a front page in which to tell it all. Thus the pressure for combat film.

Nick Archer, director of basic news for ABC, concedes that "a good fire fight is going to get on over a good pacification story." Leslie Midgely, executive producer of CBS's *Evening News with Walter Cronkite*, adds: "If you get a really great piece of war film it's irresistible." Or, as Robert Northshield, executive producer of NBC's *Huntley-Brinkley Report*, puts it: "There in no alternative [on the evening shows] to what we do. Something over 100 guys a week are getting killed there. It seems to me that by any standard, that's news." A number of the station newsmen appear to agree with this judgment. Jess Cooper, KXMB-TV Bismarck, N.D., who spent a month in Vietnam, says the "hard news" reporters may concentrate on combat to the exclusion of other facets of the war, but adds: "There are approximately 500,000 American men there. When this is multiplied by parents, friends and other relatives, there is no doubt what is of most importance to Americans."

Wouldn't expanding the half-hour network news show to an hour relax the pressure a little, permit more flexibility in handling war news? No doubt. But problems of network economics and affiliate relations appear to block such an expansion; at least ABC and CBS seem uninterested in breaking the 30-minute barrier. Northshield, however, says the hour-long show is coming, and says it's needed to cover the Vietnam war properly. He feels the war is "undercovered" now.

None of this is to say that those engaged in network coverage feel there is any need to apologize for combat film shown. McGee, whose taste, as reflected in the shows he has done, doesn't appear to run to gore, feels television's role in bringing civilians into closer contact with the war is for the better. Shortly after returning from Vietnam, where he'd been for the filming of *Same Mud, Same Blood,* McGee said: "Television has conveyed—or is in the process of conveying—what it's like out there. . . . There was a time when people were spared the knowledge of war almost altogether. That time is almost gone. While I wouldn't want the civilian population involved in a war, I see no reason not to let them know what it's like. If they can sit in front of their TV set and see what the kids are going through—and I'm not saying whether you agree with the war or not—then they'll have a better understanding of all wars."

Too much of a bad thing

"Nothing succeeds like excess," said Bernard Shaw, and the planners of the current and upcoming television schedules with their 90-minute series and 120-minute movies evidently concur.

Of course, this kind of programing may be a bit troublesome to all the people who used to write, direct, photograph, edit, costume and musicalize the dozens of shows thus eliminated. But as the Marquis de Sade so wisely observed: "There are no gains without pains."

Most knowledgable observers feel that this obsession with length has not yet reached its zenith on TV. Television shows and cigarettes have always had in common the fact that they leave one unsatisfied. To this may now be added their spiraling length.

But *big* does not always mean *better*. And as the shows get longer, it may be hard to find enough quality product in the new king size.

Visualize, if you will, a meeting of network strategists as they plan the schedule for the promising season of 1986-87.

Fade in:

Interior network conference room, day

Around a richly grained conference table sit four richly grained executives: GORMLEY, FLETCHER, MODELL and SWANN. *Each looks as worried as the owner of a sick goldfish. At the head of the coffin-shaped table stands* MONROE SAMPSON, *VP in charge of programing. He is a dynamic looking fellow whose pockets you would not pick unless you were very sure of your hands.*

SAMPSON: Now then, Thursday evening is a problem. As you all know, we're planning to program *Journey Through History*, a re-enactment of the entire Crimean War.

GORMLEY: A winner, Chief.

SAMPSON: I'm not so sure. Take a gander at what we're bucking on the other networks. A rerun of the uncut version of David Susskind's *Canterbury Tales*—

GORMLEY: Did he write that?

SAMPSON: *(ignoring him)* And a four-hour show from the White

And it should be noted that ıetwork news executives and the orrespondents insist that noncom-at stories—on Vietnamese politics nd economics, on the pacification rogram—make up a larger share f the network news-show budget ıan does combat footage; it's the ıeer brutal impact of the war cov-rage that makes it seem otherwise, ıey say. "It's ridiculous to say we over the story completely, any ıore than we cover the American ory completely," says Northshield. But I say we do provide balance." he other networks say it, too.

News judgments aside, one rea-ın for the balance is that the war, ostly and destructive as it is, is ard to find. There are no front ines, only a series of battles, usual-small-scale, erupting almost any-here but where a reporter and his ew happen to be. The military is enerous in providing transporta-on, but military needs come first, ad correspondents frequently omplain about frustrating delays in getting to where the action is. The TV reporter's problem is complicated by the fact that he is one of three men tied together by wire (his soundman and his cameraman are the other two), lugging as much as 100 pounds in equipment —a camera, sound and other assorted gear.

Says NBC's John Paxton: "One must be in the right place at the right time to get combat footage. Then, if the battle is fierce, the cameraman does not get the film because he has his face in the dirt."

Tales of frustration that TV teams experience in covering combat abound. Adam Raphael, who covered the war for CBS and who is now at Columbia University on a CBS fellowship, recalls one operation on which he was to have had an exclusive story. After a two-day wait for transportation, followed by a three-mile walk through jungle, he and his crew settled into prepared positions with two companies of Marines to await an expected Vietcong attack. The attack came, the cameraman put the camera to his eye, pushed the button and nothing happened. The battery had, inexplicably, gone dead. Suddenly the crew was superfluous; they could do nothing but wait—and sweat—and hope their comrades could fight off the attack. The Marines did—but it was another two days, during which it rained, before a water-soaked Raphael could get back to his base with nothing for his time but a little narration on tape for radio. (In remaining in the field at night, incidentally, Raphael had broken what is almost a commandment among television correspondents. Staying out, they say, is uncomfortable and dangerous; it is also pointless, since they cannot film at night. Accordingly, reporters sometimes appear to cover the war like commuters, leaving for patrol or combat in the morning, returning to base in the evening. Raphael doesn't pretend to have remained in the field as long as he did for any reason other than that he couldn't get transportation out.)

Some TV newsmen, in discussing the question of perspective—or lack of it—available from television, take comfort from the sheer weight of material they feed into the tube. There is so much, from all sides, that all angles, all issues must be covered, sooner or later, they seem to say. The correspondent who talked of his editors' eagerness for combat footage, says: "There are inevitably stories that are misleading. One story one day, with limited time on the air and restricted focus, may be off the mark. But there are many stories on many days, and focus shifts within subject matter. . . . In the long run, I believe the public gets a pretty fair over-all picture." Archer says, simply: "If you look at television long enough, you get the whole picture."

It's true, of course, the torrent of information is considerable. ABC, with 30 staffers in Saigon (including cameramen, soundmen, editors, producers) spends upwards of $1 million on its Vietnam coverage, crowds news of the war into about one-fifth of the time of its regular news shows, devotes all of its weekly half-hour *Scope* to the subject, as well as some four hour specials yearly. NBC, which maintains a staff of 25 in Saigon, spent $1 million on the war and related coverage in 1966, is currently spending at the rate of $2 million (a rate it expects to maintain in 1968), and provided about 120 hours of regu-

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by Gerald Gardner

House—Robert Kennedy sitting for a stained-glass window.

LETCHER: That *is* trouble.

AMPSON: And look at Friday. We've penciled in *The Great Lives Series*—dramatizations of the lives of Jerry Vale, Roy Cohn and Sonny Tufts.

LETCHER: What are we bucking?

AMPSON: *(bitterly)* The three-hour *Odyssey Theater*—filmed versions of the adventures of Odysseus, with added stopovers in Casablanca, Tel Aviv and Red China.

LETCHER: But we never *recognized* that show.

AMPSON: Try telling that to Nielsen. And on the other network is *Here's Oscar!*, musical dramatizations of the fables of Oscar Wilde, done back to back.

IODELL: That's a dangerous way to do the fables of Oscar Wilde.

WANN: Chief, maybe we better play it safe Friday night. We could program a three-hour double-feature western.

(Sampson slams a richly grained fist on the table.)

AMPSON: Absolutely not! We've already programed 28 hours of westerns on this network and that's plenty. There is such a thing as public responsibility.

GORMLEY: The Chief is right.

LETCHER: That's why he's the Chief.

MODELL: The public is sick of heroic cowboys.

(A dangerous quiet settles over the table as the men nervously rearrange the pattern of their legs.)

GORMLEY: Say! I've got an idea—

SAMPSON: No cowboys, Gormley.

GORMLEY: No, sir. This has nothing to do with courage in the West.

SAMPSON: Let's hear it.

GORMLEY: How about a documentary on Hollywood?

The men converge on Gormley, pounding his back and pumping his hand as music creeps in with strains of "September Song," and builds to a crescendo as we fade out.

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lar programing and 15 hours of specials, which includes presidential addresses and news conferences in 1967. CBS declines to reveal the size of its Vietnam-war-coverage budget, but with a crew of 45 in Saigon and a record of having provided some 24 hours of specials (*CBS Reports* programs among them) on Vietnam since September 1966, in addition to its regular news-show programing, its costs probably at least rivaled NBC's.

And this is merely the so-called big picture. There are also the home-towners. Rarely is there a time in South Vietnam when a television correspondent, hauling his own camera or accompanied by a cameraman, doesn't puff his way up to a platoon of GI's moving along a trail or walk out of the sun into a barracks in Danang, and sing out: "Anyone here from Des Moines" or "Albuquerque" or "Atlanta"? These are the television station people, gone to Vietnam for anywhere from one week to five weeks to do filmed stories on local boys. Military information officials report some 25 accredited in the past 18 months.

No pleasure jaunt

It's not a junket for the station representatives. Tom Capra, news director of KXTV (TV) Sacramento, Calif., for instance, reports spending 24 days in there, working 18 hours a day and shooting 17,000 feet of color film. He made the trip with Bill Pitcock of KOTV (TV) Tulsa. KXTV and KOTV are Corinthian stations. Costs for such trips vary widely among the correspondents. But there were cases of stations spending up to $5,000 (including round-trip air fare) for one man making a month-long tour of South Vietnam. However, the money appears to have been well spent, at least from a commercial point of view—the programs the correspondents bring back or ship back are frequently sold to sponsors. (There are even reports of stations selling sponsors on shows containing a certain number of home-towner interviews before the correspondent left for Vietnam—thus putting him under considerable pressure to provide a specific number of interviews. And if the quota is large enough and the station's service area small enough, the plight of the correspondent scouring the countryside for the required number of interviewees, other reporters agree, can be positively heart-rending.)

The programs themselves often represent public-relations gains for the stations and the newsmen involved. Ronald C. Scott, chief cameraman for WLBW-TV Miami for instance, was named Miami press photographer of the year for his films of an emergency landing by a bomber (piloted, as it turned out, by a Tampa man) aboard the carrier U.S.S. Intrepid in the Tonkin Gulf. Both he and his partner, Ken Taylor, WLBW-TV's news director, have become regulars on the banquet-speaking circuit in the Miami area since their return from Vietnam in the fall. WWL-TV New Orleans won a regional Emmy for a 90-minute special in color, *Vietnam '65—a Distant Christmas,* that the station's Phil Johnson, director of special projects, and cameraman Del Hall produced during a visit to Vietnam in November 1965.

Individualized approach

The station men in Vietnam frequently attempt to do something more than simple "Hi, mom" type interviews. Among the best of the station people there is the knowledge that the networks, competent and professional though they may be, cannot provide the kind of individualized service their stations need. After all, the networks must work on the assumption that what is good for New York is good for Keokuk, and vice versa. There's no reason stations in Keokuk need accept that assumption, or in New York either, for that matter.

One that doesn't, and has chosen to fill the coverage gap, is WCCO-TV Minneapolis, whose Phil Jones, reporter, and Les Solin, cameraman, visited Vietnam in 1965 and 1966, and won Radio Television News Directors Association first prizes for news coverage for the stories they produced on both occasions.

Jones says: "It's awfully difficult to bring this conflict close to home when you are showing and talking about some GI from California. . . . Our goal was to tell as much about what the war was like, and just happen to utilize Minnesotans in telling this story. We did not go 9,000 miles to have the men say hello to the mom or wife back home."

Jones's criticism of the networks extends beyond their built-in inability to do the local story. He is concerned about what he regards as their failure to do the small story that might well illuminate the larger one. He is, in effect, looking for an electronic-age Ernie Pyle—and thinks one may have turned up in the person of CBS's Laurence. "Network correspondents, with the exception of Laurence, seem to think it's 50-watt to do stories on the young enlisted types and to make sure the kid's name and home-town identification are made," he says.

Jones also feels more stations should cover the war to provide a local-angle prism through which their viewers can see what it is that's going on half a world away that is having such a profound effect on their own country. It is, in his view, as big a local story as stations can do. "I know in our market we have 5,000 to 7,000 men away in Vietnam. These parents and relatives in Minnesota are more interested in what life is like for Private John Doe, the son or husband, than they are in any news from city hall or the court house." KXMB-TV's Cooper and Dave Deich, KXJB-TV Fargo, N. D., who made the Vietnam tour together (the stations are owned by North Dakota Broadcasting Co.) are among those who have provided the kind of local-angle coverage that Jones speaks about. They did half-hour news specials on the air war and on medical activities in Vietnam, focusing in both cases on interviews with North Dakotans, or individuals with strong links to North Dakota.

Credibility gap

But if U. S. stations complain of a coverage gap, some of the network correspondents complain about a credibility gap they say U. S. officials in Saigon create. One ex-Vietnam hand, not to put too fine a point on it, says he had been "lied" to in Vietnam—that he had found people in the U. S. Mission and among the military "who saw a higher value than truth." Other correspondents were content to talk about "discrepancies" they noted between what they were told at the so-called "5 o'clock follies"—the official news briefing held each day at the mission press center—and what they were able to determine for themselves.

This points up one of the ironies of the public-information aspects the war. The information ficers, says one former Vietnam rrespondent, "are like public-lations types anywhere with a mmercial product; their product the war—they want to put it in e best light." Indeed, more than e reporter has expressed special derstanding of the "brainwash-g" charge that Michigan Gover-r George Romney leveled at iefing officers as a result of his st visit to Vietnam. But PIO's not, reporters say, tell them at to write or attempt to censor eir copy; a system of self-censor-p on the part of reporters is ied on to maintain security. And e military does make an effort transport the newsmen to any ot they want to visit. Accordingly, oorters can talk, say, to an officer the field and obtain a story con-ierably less sanguine than one ng promoted in Saigon. Says BC's Koppel: "It was frequently cause of bemusement to my col-gues and me that the briefings re so often at variance from idents that we had been allowed witness."

rrespondent investigated

Not all correspondents talk of emusement" in connection with ir dealings with the military. e who had been filing filmed oorts indicating the military sition of the enemy in his sector s stronger than Saigon was re-rting it to be says the military d investigated him "in an effort find my sources" and had at-mpted—though without success, claims—to "punch holes in my ries." (In Washington, a Depart-nt of Defense public affairs offi-l says it would not be unusual c officials to check out stories con-cting with military information. 'Ve would want to know precisely at the facts are, as a Defense De-rtment matter," he said. In that nnection, he noted that the de-rtment routinely monitors the evision network news programs d tapes every item dealing with fense matters. "This," he says, "is tribute to television—to the fact at 60% of the nation gets all or ost of its information from televi-on.")

Whether they challenged public formation officers' integrity or ot, a number of correspondents, oth network and station, said such ficers' enthusiasm for their cause ould color their briefings. But one porter whose complaint was the nderzealousness" of PIO's he ealt with was Al Austin, of WIBW-v Topeka, Kan. He said the PIO's with one particular First Infantry Division unit "were gems when it came to directing me to the mess hall, offering me beers, explaining the charms of the officers club, demonstrating how it's possible to sleep all day and getting me a jeep to the airstrip for the ride back to Saigon, but simply couldn't be bothered with giving me some idea where I might locate somebody from Kansas, even those I had listed by unit, or with figuring out some way for me to get out in the field where I'd have a chance to find some Kansans by accident. In fact, even though Operation Cedar Falls was going on and the First Division was the main force in that operation, they did everything possible to discourage me from trying to leave the base camp. They, and several other PIO's I had to cope with, seem to think the war consists of headquarters tents."

Not all reporters regard PIO's with suspicion and cynicism—or with Austin's exasperation. ABC's Ann Morrissey, who returned in November from nine months as a producer and reporter, says it's simply a matter of "doing your homework and knowing other sources to check." Joseph L. Brechner, president of WFTV (TV) Orlando, Fla., who spent eight days in Vietnam during a tour of the Far East with his wife, gave high marks to public information officers from Barry Zorthian, top U. S. public information official in Saigon, on down, and low ones to many of the corps, including network correspondents. He said the corps numbered "beatnik reporters and ridiculous young so-called intellectuals," who were "unreasoning, unreliable and completely prejudiced, writing with preconceived opinions." He himself relied heavily on official briefings, as well as trips in the field, and called on the Defense Department in Washington, for information in preparing the reports and editorials he did for his station.

It's not likely reporters who spend more than eight days in Vietnam will continue to place such trust in briefing officers, no matter what the officers' personal track record for honesty. They will, one would hope, probe and raise awkward questions, and go out into the field to track down the military units actually engaged in the fighting, and the teams doing the pacification work. (If they're real good, maybe they'll find the military on their tail, checking *them* out.) The resulting product will continue to be exposed to a nation of avid television viewers, but it remains to be seen whether it will be enough to provide the kind of hard answers the public is seeking. For it may well be, as CBS's Hart suggests, that the fault lies not in the tube, but in ourselves: "Being without a clear sense of national danger, having no handy wartime emotions or slogans to see us through, we are for the first time in a long time having to look at an intricate involvement and think for ourselves." END

News corps' honor roll of dead, wounded

The Vietnam war may be—as it is often said—different from other wars in which the U.S. has been engaged. But covering it is no less dangerous for newsmen. According to a list compiled by U.S. military information officials in Saigon, there have been 40 casualities among the news corps, including nine killed (none of them representing stations or networks) and 17 network staffers wounded.

The list, which officials do not guarantee as being complete, follows:

Wounded in action: Rodger Peterson, David Snell, Ken So, Hoang Van Tung, Larry Johnson, and Walter Oakes, all ABC; Gerard Py, John Schneider, Vallop Rodboon, all CBS; James Eury, Vo Huynh, Ron Nessou, Marvin White, S. Gary Moore, Hoan-Trong Nghia, Howard Tuckner, Dean Brelis (injury was not as a result of enemy action), all NBC; Winfried Scharlau, WGTV (TV) Athens, Ga. (educational station); Peter Larkin, UPI Television News; John Nance, Henry Huet, Rick Merron, Al Chang, Bob Ohman, John Lengel, Horst Faas, all AP; Tom Cheatham, UPI; Kathy Le Roy, free lance; Emory Christof, *National Geographic;* Mike Winters, Collegiate Press; Charles Briggs, *Contact.*

Killed in action — Bernard Kolenberg and Huynh My, both AP; Charlie Chellappah, Ronald Gallagher, Bernard Fall and Dickey Chappelle, all free lance; Phillipa Schuyler, *Manchester, (N. H.) Union-Leader*; Sam Castan, *Look* magazine; Jerry Rose (no affiliation given).

Flexible programs are needed to effectively compete with the blockbuster movie

SERIES V. MOVIES

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they are becoming scarcer and dearer. Klein says there is a limit to what the advertiser will pay, and the high cost of movies often holds out hope for the series that run alongside. They can be sold for less and still make money, while recouping $5 million for a four-hour Hollwood epic might prove more of a problem.

Mike Dann, at CBS, has his own methods for combating the movies. "Each network will schedule competitively based upon two major factors: First, of course, is program philosophy. Second is the availability of programing to fulfill that philosophy. Two years ago we decided that the best way to compete successfully with the Saturday movies was to program a comedy block. We waited for two years before we were able to move an established comedy block in there." As Dann describes it, the series CBS needed for its comedy block were not available in 1965, but after two years of weeding-out and rearranging its situation comedies, the network felt it had found a strong combination.

Tested programs

CBS takes less of a risk against movies. Almost everything leading into and up against that tough Saturday movie was tested in another time period first. There are some preliminary, disqualifying matches before the championship bout. The Saturday prime time line-up includes such tried-and-true series as *Petticoat Junction* and *Hogan's Heroes*. "I think it is very dangerous to program the story form against the feature film," Dann concludes.

Not everyone agrees that pitting a comedy rather than a dramatic series against a movie always makes good programing sense. NBC's Klein believes that to beat the movies you must offer programing with the same dynamic value as movies. "They are a young-adult property. If you are competing against them with strong, young-adult television shows you hurt the movies." Klein adds: "I would rather compete now, in today's market, *against* the movies. I would also like to make movies and call them television shows."

Mort Werner concurs with his NBC colleague, and he recommends more time before sentencing: "I am not just talking about air time, but time to see the next 10 episodes." Using NBC's *Ironsides* as an example, Werner says a dramatic show may have more trouble getting off the ground early in the year, but in the long run, it may be the most effective counter-programing. "The idea of telling a story is a rather old form and the movies do that and do it well. And they spend a lot of money and a lot of time doing that," Werner explains.

The cop outs

All three networks run a certain amount of cop-out programing after 10. ABC leaves one hour without network programing on Thursday night and a half hour on Saturday. NBC runs news specials and *The Bell Telephone Hour* against the CBS Friday night movie; both the documentaries and the *Telephone Hour* are notorious for garnering only a small, select audience. CBS has also relegated its sponsored *News Hour* to a 10 p.m. slot opposite the NBC Tuesday night movie.

The one defense against the feature films that has neared unanimity from program and media people is "hypo-able" programing. Anything that is flexible—anthologies, variety shows—anything that allows the rating game to be played by ear, anything that is not filmed 10 weeks in advance, stands a better chance than the film series. *The Dean Martin Show, The Carroll Burnett Show,* and *The Hollywood Palace* all allow evaluation as they go along, alteration as they go along. Such a program can be bolstered with big names when "Mutiny on the Bounty" is scheduled opposite. Such a program can relax somewhat when it competes with a lesser movie. Klein predicts: "There will come a day when every show will have a flexibility, and that day will come within two years."

While films and specials abound, the media researcher is handicapped in yet another way as one of his basic tools—the local ratings—becomes inadequate. The local ratings are arrived at by averaging four weeks of data. Sample size is too small for rating on a week-by-week basis. When four weeks of movies run the gamut from "Cleopatra" to a 1929 quickie, the local ratings average the epic and the quickie, throwing out the baby with the bath water. Fred Brandt, with the complicated title of assistant vice president and group account supervisor of the media information and analysis division at Ted Bates & Co., doesn't see any solution to this media hardship. He believes that there is a ceiling on what the subscriber will finance in the way of audience studies: "Both NSI and ARB are working within the limitations of economic considerations. They both have to make money."

The measurement of feature-film audiences says Brandt, is difficult on a local basis: "It would be strictly guesswork because what happens nationally may may not happen in a market. Take a movie like 'Meet Me in St. Louis.' It may not do well nationally, but in St. Louis. . . ." But Brandt sees an even bigger problem evaluating the specials by local ratings. If Lawrence Welk is pre-empted once during the four-week period for a special, it'll throw the average out of whack. A wildly successful special will buoy the series' rating while a flop will drag it down. And it is even harder to determine how the special fared by itself.

Seasonal view

Even the national ratings, which bear the responsibility for many a programing decision, are not the barometer they once were. As NBC's Werner sums up the new approach to the ratings: "The weekly rating analysis is somewhat meaningless. You have to look at it from a seasonal point of view."

With the breakdown of the old criteria of programing excellence and audience response, the programers and the advertisers have a new problem on their hands. The people who make such decisions as what programs are aired and what programs are bought can no longer rely on a few weeks' worth of rating points to help them decide. The backlog of specials is starting to build and decision-makers are coming to rely on precedents.

Most of all, the decision-makers are relying on their own sensitivities. Mike Dann describes this new challenge: "I think it's a wonderful problem to be exposed to. That the viewer becomes highly selective and is not locked into the same program week after week is a healthy thing."

"Wonderful," maybe. Thorny, indeed. END

TELE STATUS

DATA ROUNDUP

January Telestatus consolidates in a single listing the PKL/Nielsen Station Index local-market estimates published during the last quarter—multiset, color and CATV penetration by market.

In fall of 1967, multiset ownership was estimated at 28% of U. S. TV homes. The data show that multiset penetration follows market size, with highest levels in the largest markets.

Nielsen estimates CATV penetration at slightly over 4% for spring of 1967. CATV growth has been greatest in the smaller markets—just the reverse of multiset. Nielsen data shows highest CATV penetration in "C" county markets and mountainous areas. There are 75 markets (mostly smaller ones) where CATV penetration is greater than 10%.

Fall color-set ownership was estimated at 23% Color penetration patterns relate more to geographic region and state than to size of market. The Pacific Coast, at 32% color, is well above the national average; the South, at 18%, well below it. Of the 10 highest-percent color markets, five are in California.

In the following tables, markets are ranked on the basis of station total homes reached during prime time by all stations originating in the market. These were developed by Papert, Koenig, Lois from NSI February/March 1967 data. NSI area households, the area containing substantially all of the homes reached by the market's stations, are as defined by Nielsen as of September 1967.

Three markets—Akron, Ohio; Anderson, S. C., and Worcester, Mass.—are not reportable by Nielsen (prime-time station total homes reached) and therefore cannot be ranked. Data for these markets is included at the end of the listings.

Nielsen cautions that because NSI data are sample-base estimates they are subject to sampling error and thus should not be regarded as exact to precise mathematical values. The PKL projections have the additional error-possibility associated with forecasting.

Next issue Telestatus will present February local market color projections. These exclusive estimates will show the effects of strong year-end color-set sales on local-market color penetration.

ENCOUNTER: TRAYLOR

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however, you can almost see the point at which one or more new UHF's went on the air or, where new programing and/or promotion caused people to take their first look at UHF stations.

This first table shows some dramatic growth in the households in established VHF markets tuning to UHF at least once a week. Now, let's look at some *average quarter-hour ratings* for these markets:

Again, UHF network affiliates in all-UHF markets fare extremely well. But in the mixed markets, during the prime network hours when their VHF, network-affiliated competitors are enjoying their highest ratings, the UHF trend is considerably less dramatic. The V's still retain the lion's share of the audience.

Low audience levels are by no means confined to UHF stations, as is evidenced by the average ratings of independent nonnetwork VHF stations in New York and Los Angeles during certain dayparts. Facilities, then, are not the sole consideration; *programing* is also a major consideration.

It should also be noted that, in sampling, possession of a UHF set in and of itself has little or no effect on response rates. Cooperation among UHF-equipped households appears, in general, to be about the same as among households that report that they cannot receive UHF.

It is for these reasons among others, incidentally, that NSI does not cell-project UHF audiences, feeling that we would add little or nothing to the accuracy of our audience estimates.

Certain conclusions we think are obvious: that mere possession of a UHF set is not assurance of UHF tuning—that is, UHF "ownership" or "penetration" figures are in no sense audience figures; that UHF stations with network affiliations, competing against other UHF stations, can and do attract mass audiences; that UHF stations competing with VHF network affiliates face a much tougher problem; that on a national basis UHF still comprises the "small half" of all the household hours devoted to television.

However, UHF *is* growing. Even

		*Average metro quarter hour audiences to the leading UHF station, prime time (7:30—11:00)**		
	UHF markets	*March 1965*	*February 1966*	*Feb/Mar 1967*
Markets illustrative of situations with 3 or more VHF'S with network affiliation	Boston	0.1%#	0.3%#	2
	Chicago	—	0.5#	0.7#
	Detroit	2	2	3
	Los Angeles	0.1#	0.2#	0.3#
	New York	—	0.1#	0.2#
	Philadelphia	—	2	2
	Washington	0.1#	0.3#	1
Markets illustrative of all UHF situations, each having 3U's affiliated with nets	Fresno	26	25	25
	Peoria	25	23	23
	South Bend	20	25	27

* *The figures are NSI estimates during the average week of the measurement interval. In the event of statistical ties, one station was selected.*
# *Audiences too low for reportability minimum.*

Market	NSI areas TV households	CATV — NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership — PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership — PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
New York	5,651,530	—	43	20
Los Angeles	3,591,710	—	34	37
Chicago	2,463,540	—	34	21
Philadelphia	2,234,940	—	36	27
Boston	1,870,650	—	32	21
Detroit	1,604,980	—	36	25
Cleveland	1,368,010	—	35	30
San Francisco-Oakland	1,546,910	—	30	28
Pittsburgh	1,303,720	—	32	22
Washington	1,585,220	—	35	20
Average for markets 1–10			**35**	**25**
St. Louis	841,930	—	29	20
Dallas-Fort Worth	878,890	—	27	21
Minneapolis-St. Paul	737,840	—	27	17
Indianapolis	776,850	—	30	30
Baltimore	979,390	—	34	19
Cincinnati	828,470	—	35	30
Houston	632,470	—	23	22
Hartford-New Haven, Conn.	1,049,850	—	29	24
Milwaukee	613,580	—	33	29
Kansas City, Mo.	643,020	—	26	17
Average for markets 11–20			**29**	**23**
Average for markets 1–20			**32**	**24**
Buffalo, N.Y. (U. S. only)	589,110	—	27	24
Seattle-Tacoma	635,100	—	26	27
Miami-Fort Lauderdale	628,400	—	27	23
24 Atlanta	626,480	—	2[illegible]	19
25 Sacramento-Stockton, Calif.	665,950	—	27	40
26 Columbus, Ohio	538,220	—	35	32
27 Memphis	532,730	—	19	15
28 Portland, Ore.	552,820	10–20	25	26
29 Denver	448,960	—	32	29
30 Tampa-St. Petersburg, Fla.	497,140	—	19	22
Average for markets 21–30			**26**	**26**
Average for markets 1–30			**30**	**25**
31 New Orleans	457,630	—	26	22
32 Nashville	513,250	—	17	14
33 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, N.Y.	612,120	—	26	22
34 Birmingham, Ala.	515,930	—	18	17
35 Providence, R.I.	1,526,660	—	32	21
36 Syracuse, N.Y.	570,040	10–20	25	23
37 Charleston-Huntington, W.Va.	442,160	10–20	22	20
38 Louisville, Ky.	432,430	—	22	17
39 Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo, Mich.	605,160	—	27	24
40 Oklahoma City	387,630	—	19	16

NOTE: NSI areas with less than 10% CATV penetration indicated by (—). PKL market rankings based upon average quarter-hour, prime time, station total homes reached—all stations combined. NSI February-March 1967 survey.

NSI area households are as of September 1967 and are reprinted with permission of A.C. Nielsen Co.

Source: A. C. Nielsen Co.
PKL Estimates

the "mixed" markets, certain itions and time periods, with od programing and promotion, e beginning to build substantial idiences. END

ENCOUNTER: PETGEN

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ars, but have we had "in-depth" coincidental? An in-depth coincidental requires: (1) seven telephone rings instead of five; (2) double check in multiple-viewing households; (3) program title matches as well as channel selection.

One tri-market study afforded an unusual opportunity to contrast statistics between diary and in-depth telephone coincidental. Results followed the familiar upward-for-independent, downward-for-network trend, already noted by measurement services in their comparisons of diary and instantaneous meter.

Using the in-depth telephone coincidental, Med-Mark found an average 64% greater audience share for UHF's in Dayton, Ohio; Charlotte, N.C., and Toledo, Ohio, than Nielsen did with a diary technique.

A significant difference was also apparent in early fringe viewing. In the three-city total, the UHF stations were 108% higher in ratings, and 107% higher in audience shares, while only 3% higher than Nielsen's sets-in-use figures.

In the daytime viewing category, Med-Mark found a change of plus 28% in the sets-in-use level; while the UHF's showed a change of plus 200% in the ratings, and plus 130% in audience shares.

During prime time when diary error is least, Med-Mark found only a 1% increase in sets-in-use and changes of plus 23% in the ratings and plus 21% in shares for the UHF tri-market total.

These figures are their own ammunition. And they should spark the support of the entire industry for equitable and reliable research. It is the concern of everyone to insure that the growth of all-channel additions is not hampered by inadequate or insensitive research technique. END

FOCUS ON COMMERCIALS

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tra sharp thinking, can be the key not only to savings but to a more creative product."

The account man, too, will be in the middle of the financial tug-of-war, and his role can be critical. Probably nothing adds more to the actual cost of a commercial (not what we say we're going to spend, but what we really spend) than two factors the account man can help control: too little time, too much confusion.

"We'll get it on the air somehow," is a great battle cry. It makes everyone proud to know that an impossible deadline can, in fact, be met. But then come the bills. Then we pay for the meeting that should have been held on Tuesday but was casually put off until Thursday. Then we pay for the postponed decision.

Crash programs are great, but never free, and the account man (as well as everyone else) can strike a blow for economy by keeping the commercial strictly to its appointed timetable.

Confusion, too, is everybody's responsibility, but the account man is in a particularly good position to stamp out what is surely the most wasteful element in the commercial. It is simply criminal to let the cameras roll before everyone has agreed on the objectives and the means that will be used to get there. And one can never check too often to make sure the production people have the right package, the right price, the right instructions on how the product must be shown in use.

A third area in which the account man can help is scheduling. If he understands the new SAG holding-fee requirements, substan-

Market	NSI areas TV households	CATV — NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership — PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership — PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
Average for markets 31–40			23	20
Average for markets 1–40			28	23
41 Dayton, Ohio	532,910	—	34	33
42 Wichita-Hutchinson, Kan.	264,160	—	20	22
43 Greenville-Spartanburg, S.C.-Asheville, N.C.	670,930	—	18	16
44 Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News, Va.	345,990	—	24	17
45 Omaha	342,070	—	18	19
46 Salt Lake City	294,050	—	26	25
47 San Antonio, Tex.	413,190	—	22	15
48 Phoenix	344,560	—	26	22
49 Tulsa, Okla.	395,870	—	17	15
50 Lancaster-Harrisburg-Lebanon-York Pa.	582,770	20+	26	31
Average for markets 41–50			23	22
Average for markets 1–50			27	23
51 San Diego	356,400	10–20	32	35
52 Charlotte, N.C.	613,160	—	19	15
53 Greensboro-High Point-Winston-Salem, N.C.	502,800	—	19	15
54 Wilkes Barre-Scranton, Pa.	406,620	20+	23	29
55 Orlando-Daytona Beach, Fla.	405,220	—	20	20
56 Davenport-Rock Island-Moline, Ill.	342,620	—	22	24
57 Little Rock-Pine Bluff, Ark.	310,740	—	17	17
58 Toledo, Ohio	425,940	—	29	26
59 Rochester, N.Y.	368,630	—	30	24
60 Shreveport, La.	307,260	—	20	17
Average for markets 51–60			23	22
Average for markets 1–60			27	23
61 Green Bay, Wis.	379,560	—	24	24
62 Des Moines-Ames, Iowa	301,580	—	14	22
63 Richmond-Petersburg, Va.	328,890	—	22	12
64 Flint-Saginaw-Bay City Mich.	469,870	—	27	27
65 Mobile, Ala.-Pensacola, Fla.	292,390	—	18	18
66 Champaign-Springfield-Decatur, Ill.	312,910	—	22	30
67 Johnstown-Altoona, Pa	1,075,550	10–20	30	20
68 Paducah, Ky.-Harrisburg, Ill.-Cape Girardeau, Mo.	296,400	—	15	18
69 Cedar Rapids-Waterloo Iowa	312,710	—	16	24
70 Fresno, Calif.	235,080	—	20	36
Average for markets 61–70			21	23
Average for markets 1–70			26	23
71 Jacksonville, Fla.	270,740	—	25	19
72 Raleigh-Durham, N.C.	378,070	—	17	14
73 Roanoke-Lynchburg, Va.	310,740	—	20	16
74 Spokane, Wash.	289,940	20+	21	27
75 Youngstown, Ohio	275,470	—	30	29
76 Knoxville, Tenn.	290,640	—	21	18
77 Portland-Poland Spring, Me.	415,720	—	22	15
78 Fort Wayne, Ind.	237,760	—	24	29
79 Jackson, Miss.	277,890	—	17	18
80 South Bend-Elkhart, Ind.	265,990	—	24	29
Average for markets 71–80			22	21
Average for markets 1–80			25	23
81 Chattanooga	229,750	20+	21	20
82 Albuquerque, N.M.	196,540	—	20	17
83 Madison, Wis.	280,980	—	21	27
84 Peoria, Ill.	245,790	—	22	26
85 Evansville, Ind.-Henderson, Ky.	215,180	—	21	19
86 Wheeling, W. Va.-Steubenville, Ohio	990,240	—	33	22

NOTE: NSI areas with less than 10% CATV penetration indicated by (—).
PKL market rankings based upon average quarter-hour, prime time, station total homes reached—all stations combined. NSI February-March 1967 survey.
NSI area households are as of September 1967 and are reprinted with permission of A. C. Nielsen Co.
Source: A. C. Nielsen Co.
PKL Estimates

FOCUS ON COMMERCIALS

from page 63

tial savings can often be made.

Perhaps the most difficult role of all is played by the client.

Here comes the agency, eager and enthusiastic. They've got a great idea; they're sure of it. It just happens to cost about twice as much as you, the client, had expected to pay. Behind you stands your company's financial team, armed with computer and long-range projections, ready to wonder out loud why anyone would pay a bunch of Hollywood types all that money to shoot thousands of feet of film when he knew from the start that he couldn't possibly use more than 90. On your desk is a budget that says every penny is committed.

And still, they do seem to have a good idea. If only it weren't so costly.

My own view, of course, is prejudiced. But it seems to me it's the right one: If you have any confidence at all in your agency, if you and they have done their homework conscientiously, then I say, "spend the money." Maybe you'll be sorry if you do; surely you'll be sorry if you do not. Even if you save the money, your boss will never look at the screen and say: "That's a mighty fine budget you preserved." But he just might heave that executive sigh and remark: "I dunno, George, it seems to lack something. . ."

Again, from a biased view, I think too many people in our business fail to relate the cost of commercial production to the cost of putting the finished product on the air.

After all, if you use a commercial 10 times, an increase of $5,000 in production cost will add $500 to the cost of each presentation. If your time averages $30,000 per minute, you will have increased your real costs by something under 2%. So, if that idea your agency likes so much seems to have a reasonable chance of improving the effectiveness of your commercial by 2% or more, you should try to find the money somewhere, and let them do it.

Each of us, then, has an obligation to join our commercial producers in facing the problems of rising costs in a frank and professional manner; to spend the money it takes to do things right, but to make sure the money we spend shows up in a useful way in the finished commercial.

It seems to me that we are beginning to see a rising willingness to meet these obligations. Let's hope the trend continues throughout a successful 1968. **END**

Market	NSI areas TV households	CATV NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
Mason City, Iowa-Austin, Minn.-Rochester, Minn.	247,330	—	16	19
Lansing, Mich.	554,950	—	29	29
Baton Rouge	361,100	—	18	20
Honolulu	168,990	—	17	17
Average for markets 81–90			22	22
Average for markets 1–90			25	23
Lincoln-Hastings-Kearney, Neb.	232,960	—	14	21
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Tex.	178,390	—	23	20
Duluth, Minn.-Superior, Wis.	146,580	—	20	18
Amarillo, Tex.	141,880	10–20	19	26
Rockford, Ill.	227,330	—	27	30
Greenville-New Bern-Washington, N.C.	230,930	—	16	15
Sioux Falls, S.D.	173,720	—	16	15
Fargo-Grand Forks-Valley City, N.D.	159,340	—	18	16
Sioux City, Iowa	192,180	—	16	19
Springfield, Mo.	179,770	—	14	16
Average for markets 91–100			18	20
Average for markets 1–100			24	22
Binghamton, N.Y.	267,020	20+	19	20
Columbus, Ga.	291,510	—	20	16
Wichita Falls, Tex.-Lawton, Okla.	168,890	10–20	18	20
Joplin, Mo.-Pittsburgh, Kan.	176,750	10–20	17	19
Springfield-Holyoke, Mass.	406,460	—	29	21
Terre Haute, Ind.	212,600	—	18	23
Colorado Springs-Pueblo	124,220	—	28	27
El Paso, Tex.	126,340	—	30	18
Monroe, La-El Dorado, Ark.	213,870	10–20	17	18
Tucson, Ariz	153,080	10–20	21	24
Monterey-Salinas, Calif.	950,720	—	30	31
Charleston, S.C.	183,520	—	24	18
Waco-Temple, Tex.	160,240	—	15	15
Quincy, Ill-Hannibal, Mo-Keokuk, Iowa	139,210	—	17	26

Market	NSI areas TV households	CATV NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
115 Erie, Pa.	205,310	10–20	23	22
116 Harrisburg, Pa.	430,490	20+	25	30
117 Bristol, Va.-Johnson City-Kingsport, Tenn.	217,230	10–20	16	14
118 Columbia, S.C.	225,370	—	20	17
119 Lubbock, Tex.	126,620	—	22	35
120 Augusta, Ga.	258,020	—	21	16
121 Burlington, Vt.-Plattsburg, N.Y.	211,640	20+	21	13
122 Corpus Christi, Tex.	125,930	—	22	19
123 LaFayette, La.	215,310	—	19	17
124 Montgomery, Ala.	179,720	—	17	18
125 Abilene-Sweetwater-San Angelo, Tex.	113,090	10–20	19	27
Average for markets 101–125			21	21
Average for markets 1–125			24	22
126 Wausau-Rhinelander, Wis.	163,700	—	19	14
127 Columbia-Jefferson City, Mo.	132,530	—	15	17
128 Odessa-Midland-Monahans, Tex.	113,630	10–20	22	29
129 Lexington, Ky.	149,340	10–20	20	16
130 Cadillac-Traverse City, Mich.	183,420	—	21	18
131 Yakima, Wash.	139,410	20+	20	32
132 Huntsville-Decatur, Ala.	143,460	20+	17	17
133 Boise, Idaho	97,160	—	19	25
134 Savannah, Ga.	121,150	—	16	14
135 Harlingen-Weslaco, Tex.	80,720	—	18	13
136 Austin, Tex.	166,380	10–20	17	14
137 Bakersfield, Calif.	157,440	—	20	35
138 Las Vegas	84,940	—	34	42
139 Bangor, Me.	131,700	—	19	17
140 Beckley-Bluefield, W.Va.	289,860	10–20	21	17
141 La Crosse, Wis.	156,940	10–20	16	16
142 Chico-Redding, Calif.	137,450	—	20	33

NOTE: NSI areas with less than 10% CATV penetration indicated by (—). PKL market rankings based upon average quarter-hour, prime time, station total homes reached—all stations combined. NSI February-March 1967 survey. NSI area households are as of September 1967 and are reprinted with permission of A. C. Nielsen Co.

Source: A. C. Nielsen Co.
PKL Estimates

ECHNICAL UPHEAVAL

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ums around it.

When CBS first disclosed the ew technology, the announcement revolved around England here an instructional television market sits like an anxious spinster aiting to be courted by the nicest chnological suitor that comes ong.

No doubt CBS would like to e the British government's plan r a University of the Air turned to the University of the EVR artridge. The instruction by BBC elevision, which is tentatively lanned to start in 1970, has come nder attack in England from ome who consider it a wasteful llocation of a mass communica-ion channel, the very argument that EVR seems designed to answer. (See London report in "On Location," TELEVISION, December 1967.)

And two British companies have been chosen as the first manufacturers of EVR equipment. They are Ilford Ltd., which has collaborated with CBS on development of the specialized film stock for use in the home version of EVR (an 8.75 mm sprocketless film) and which will make the prerecorded cartridges, and Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd., which will make the home playback units. If CBS wants to exploit the English market, and it does, it couldn't have been wiser than to pick local boys for the manufacturing chores.

Actually the arrangements with Ilford and Thorn stem from the CBS partnership with Imperial Chemical Industries, the giant British company, and CIBA Inc. of Switzerland. This association, in which CBS holds 50% interest and the others, 25% each, was given license to manufacture and distribute the cartridges and players throughout the world with the important exception of the United States and Canada, a presumably wealthy area for exploitation for which CBS has other plans.

As of last month CBS had not announced a U. S. manufacturer or distributor for the home EVR system, and what approach it would take to the home playback market in this country remained something of a mystery. Earlier unofficial but high-level comments out of CBS had indicated a cautious reserve about EVR's potential as a home entertainment medium.

A ripple of doubt about EVR's readiness ran through the broadcasting business last month when it was reported that CBS Labs had withdrawn from a tentative obligation to give a paper on the system

Market	NSI areas TV households	CATV NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
143 Topeka, Kan.	141,870	—	17	16
144 Alexandria, Minn.	111,000	—	11	14
145 West Palm Beach, Fla.	281,760	—	26	24
146 Eugene, Ore.	138,090	20+	18	27
147 Macon, Ga.	121,700	10–20	18	15
148 Tallahassee, Fla.	177,400	—	17	15
149 Wilmington, Del.	186,730	—	19	18
150 Bismarck, N.D.	55,450	—	13	15
Average for markets 126–150			19	21
Average for markets 1–150			23	22
151 Albany, Ga.	162,070	—	18	15
152 Florence, S.C.	217,990	—	19	18
153 Reno	84,310	20+	24	35
154 Utica-Rome, N.Y.	233,900	10–20	21	21
155 Aberdeen, Miss.-Florence, Ala.	73,550	—	10	16
156 Billings, Mont.	68,510	10–20	18	20
157 Idaho Falls, Idaho	63,980	—	16	31
158 Alexandria, La.	154,200	10–20	15	16
159 Rapid City, S.D.	64,650	—	15	14
160 Meridian, Miss.	116,670	10–20	15	16
161 Mankato, Minn.	120,940	10–20	14	17
162 Great Falls, Mont.	56,920	20+	20	22
163 Medford, Ore.	63,400	10–20	20	28
164 Fort Smith, Ark.	96,390	—	10	12
165 Cheyenne, Wyo.-Scottsbluff, Neb.-Sterling, Colo.	129,260	10–20	19	23
166 Marquette, Mich.	65,300	20+	14	13
167 Roswell-Carlsbad, N.M.	73,100	20+	17	25
168 Dothan, Ala.	121,740	—	15	16
169 St. Joseph, Mo.	188,420	—	17	15
170 Eureka, Calif.	51,400	—	21	25
171 Ottumwa, Iowa	99,590	—	9	18
172 Ensign-Garden City, Kan.	48,980	10–20	16	23
173 Clarksburg-Weston, W. Va.	145,840	20+	15	19
174 Santa Barbara, Calif.	200,680	10–20	27	34
175 Eau Claire, Wis.	151,330	10–20	19	15
Average for markets 151–175			17	20
Average for markets 1–175			22	22
176 Panama City, Fla.	137,800	10–20	15	17
177 Columbus, Miss.	94,760	10–20	10	10
178 Watertown, N.Y.	75,490	20+	20	20
179 Mitchell-Reliance, S.D.	57,040	—	9	13
180 Hattiesburg-Laurel, Miss.	124,150	10–20	17	19
181 Butte, Mont.	69,320	20+	17	18
182 Minot, N.D.	41,840	—	15	9
183 North Platte-Hayes Center-McCook, Neb.	58,100	—	13	21
184 Grand Junction-Montrose Colo.	50,350	20+	12	16
185 Casper, Wyo.	46,400	20+	20	21
186 Biloxi, Miss.	128,440	—	16	20
187 Tyler, Tex.	129,200	10–20	20	14
188 Lake Charles, La.	87,250	—	20	18
189 Greenwood, Miss.	96,540	20+	14	17

NOTE: NSI areas with less than 10% CATV penetration indicated by (—).
PKL market rankings based upon average quarter-hour, prime time, station total homes reached—all stations combined. NSI February-March 1967 survey.
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Source: A. C. Nielsen Co.
PKL Estimates

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before the industry's engineers at their annual session during the convention of the National Association of Broadcasters in late March.

A CBS Labs representative said the company, after due deliberation, had decided against delivering the technical paper on EVR, that it would be "precipitous" to do so since actual demonstration of the system probably wouldn't take place before May. Later, reversing field, he said the question of delivering a paper on EVR at the convention had never come up, but that this did not rule out the possibility that one would be presented. The company, understandably, wanted all options open and the NAB, cooperating, indicated there was a chance that CBS would make an EVR presentation while noting that such papers are usually tied to actual demonstrations.

The situation bore remarkable similarity to the last introduction of a new medium of television storage and replay, video tape. Ten years ago the possibility of a videotape demonstration at the industry convention was an on-again-off-again thing while Ampex and RCA struggled to be first on the market with a tape system. Ampex made a loud splash at the 1957 NAB meeting.

There is no official proof that CBS will have difficulty getting patents on EVR, but such speculation would not be outrageously far fetched because it is not the only laboratory working with the electron beam recording technique that is at the heart of the system.

There may be bugs to be squashed, but EVR was far enough along last October to precipitate a major corporate realignment at CBS that included the formation of a new division, the CBS/Comtec Group. Comtec (which is short for communications technology) is charged with research, development, prototype manufacture and marketing of new communications systems for education, industry and home.

Elected president of the division was Felix Kalinski, the bright corporate-acquisition scout for CBS prior to the new assignment. Placed within Comtec's sphere were CBS Labs, the new CBS/EVR Inc. and a new CBS Television Services Division. Tooling up corporately for the marketing exertion—well before a production die was cast—placed an intermediary between CBS President Frank Stanton and the scientist-businessman Goldmark, who became no less the leader of his Stamford, Conn., laboratory domain, but whose influence on marketing decisions would thereafter be subject to the review of Kalinski.

While CBS sweats over patents and proof of performance in the field and reorganizes for the new business that might accrue, competitive systems are in various stages of development, both in home recorders and systems at least somewhat comparable to BEVR. Inexpensive home TV recording and playback machines have done a tantalizing dance on the imagination of electronic engineers for years but have never fully revealed themselves. An instant-home-movie-on-television system at low cost could fetch a broad public.

CBS does not pretend to have a home recording device, but the playback capability that it boasts for EVR has no publicized equal. Prototypes of low-priced home video-tape recorders—those reported

Market	NSI areas TV households	CATV: NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership: PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership: PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
Harrisonburg, Va.	108,500	10–20	15	12
Salisbury, Md.	56,340	20+	16	16
Hays-Goodland, Kan.	64,170	—	12	19
Ardmore, Okla-Sherman-Denison, Tex.	76,230	20+	14	13
Lima, Ohio	95,150	—	22	28
Manchester, N.H.	1,132,440	—	32	21
Twin Falls, Idaho	33,030	10–20	15	25
Yuma, Ariz.	32,470	20+	21	25
Williston, N.D.	31,670	—	13	11
Fort Myers, Fla.	45,330	20+	17	22
Lufkin, Tex.	50,210	10–20	15	13
Average for markets 176–200			**16**	**18**
Average for markets 1–200			**21**	**21**
Ada, Okla.	106,600	10–20	13	11
Presque Isle, Me.	23,990	10–20	17	11
Tupelo, Miss.	69,870	10–20	9	8
Missoula, Mont.	59,700	20+	16	20
Jackson, Tenn.	93,560	—	15	9
Klamath Falls, Ore.	26,210	20+	20	26
Florence, Ala.	35,460	20+	11	14
Zanesville, Ohio	51,290	10–20	23	26
Jonesboro, Ark.	102,680	—	14	16
Bellingham, Wash.	118,040	10–20	24	29
Dickinson, N.D.	30,160	—	12	7
Fort Dodge, Iowa	57,190	—	11	19
Laredo, Tex.	15,550	20+	19	8
Lafayette, Ind.	58,060	20+	19	30
Parkersburg, W.Va.	43,790	20+	17	19
Bowing Green, Ky.	180,240	—	15	16
Riverton, Wyo.	14,600	10–20	18	18
Muncie-Marion, Ind.	129,890	—	28	35

Market	NSI areas TV households	CATV: NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership: PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership: PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
219 Pembina, N.D.	23,850	—	[illegible]	9
220 Glendive, Mont.	4,170	—	12	7
221 Selma, Ala.	15,170	10–20	12	16
Average for markets 201–221			**16**	**17**
Average for markets 1–221			**21**	**21**
Worcester, Mass.*	181,850	—	29	26
Akron, Ohio*	298,980	—	35	39
Anderson, S.C.*	27,320	—	14	19

* *Not included in PKL ranking.*

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Source: A.C. Nielsen Co.
PKL Estimates

Territory	NSI areas TV households	CATV: NSI estimates spring 1967 %	Multiset ownership: PKL Oct. 1967 projections %	Color-set ownership: PKL Nov. 1967 projections %
Northeast	14,732,910	4	32	22
East Central	9,034,590	4	31	25
West Central	10,102,510	3	26	21
South	13,619,820	4	21	18
Pacific	8,538,360	6	29	32
Total U.S.*	56,049,190	4%	28%	23%

* *Excluding Alaska & Hawaii.*

the $300 range—have all shown excessively high tape speeds, between 30 and 60 inches per second. A stationary recording head, apparently a requirement of the cheaper systems, necessitates high-speed tape travel, but would make home operation too unwieldy and too expensive in terms of tape consumed.

ABC's color-from-black-and-white process, being developed by Technical Operations, has no immediate relevance to a home television playback facility. It is described as an optical camera system with no electronic strings attached that could be used for location shooting. Its immediate application might be as a newsfilm medium using black-and-white developing techniques, but giving color pictures.

An ABC official says field testing of the equipment may begin within the next three months and that a station, probably an ABC-owned property, will soon be outfitted to handle the new film. In addition to a special field camera the process involves a modification of the studio projection system for origination. In mid-November 1967, ABC, which owned 19% of Technical Operations, sold that interest, but work being done there on the film process remains ABC's property.

The technical director of one of the largest film processing companies in the country says he has doubts about the readiness of any new color film system but admits that if the processes already developed live up to their notices, "it will be traumatic" for those who have invested heavily in color film processing equipment.

Sifting rumor from reasonable speculation, television seems about to embrace a new set of storage-and-replay technologies. And the medium that displaces conventional film or tape systems in the TV industry may compete with itself as the medium for home television playback. But how the inventors divvy the rewards of their inventiveness remains to be seen. Wall Street isn't touting anybody's system until the patent reports are in and the equipment is demonstrated. END

EDITORIAL

Every night at the movies

☐ No night next season will be without its network movie if present scheduling and announced intentions still obtain in September 1968. NBC has laid claim to its third movie night in 1968-69 on Monday, the only night unoccupied by a network movie during this season. There is no evidence that ABC and CBS will retreat from the two nights of movies each is presenting now.

If counterprograming the others' movies has been a problem for the networks in 1967-68, as explained in an article in this issue, it will only be a bigger problem from now on. Not beyond conjecture is the possibility that some network will decide the way to attack another's movie night is with a movie of its own.

But whatever scheduling innovations may appear, it is now certain that all three networks are heavily committed to the motion-picture form. Collectively they will need pictures numbering in the hundreds to get through a television year. That need will only intensify their ventures into feature production that are described in another article in this issue. The same need inevitably will lead to an escalation of prices that the owners of existing motion pictures of demonstrable box-office value can command for television exposure.

All this just may precipitate a difficult period in relations between networks and their affiliated stations. The ingredients of an explosion already exist. They need only to be brought together by miscalculation or chance to touch off a violent reaction.

For most of television's history the motion picture was a station property to be used in periods that the networks did not fill. As the stations' income rose, they were able to pay more for their movies. The distributors of movies could take films out of theatrical release before they had made the last circuit of the grind houses. As newer and better pictures came off the local transmitter, audiences increased, advertising rates increased, and the stations had acquired a nonnetwork program source that not only produced maximum revenue but also provided an alternative to play in prime time if, for tactical or other reasons, an affiliate chose not to clear two hours for its network's offerings.

In the early sixties the networks got the word. Since then all three have been taking the pick of movie availabilities for network scheduling. With relatively few exceptions, hit pictures have been marketed to individual stations only after one, two or more network runs. Today the station that goes shopping for its own movies must accept properties that have already had national exposure on the air, after national exposure in theaters, and must pay more for proved films than it used to pay before networks got into the movie market.

Not only have the stations lost first-run movie product to the networks; they have taken a cut in the revenue they get from putting movies on their air. The affiliate clearing time for a network movie gets a maximum of 30% of its regular rate for carrying an average of 14 minutes of network commercials. It would get 100% of its spot rate for those same minutes, less deductions of agency and rep commissions, if the same movie originated in its own projector.

Implicit in the growing use of movies on the networks and in the higher prices for them that the networks pay is a still smaller proportion of compensation for affiliated stations. Last year NBC proposed to increase its movie minutes from 14 to 16 and retain the extra revenue. Affiliates successfully resisted, but they and stations on the other networks must expect to be confronted by similar proposals, though perhaps in different form, again.

Affiliates are not without some bargaining power in this situation. The loss of a few clearances in major markets can be critical to a network that must get premium rates from advertisers to defray its movie expenses. The affiliates' principal problem, if they wish to apply the tactical threat of refusal to clear, is to find suitable programing to substitute for the network feature.

Some affiliates still own movie packages containing strong enough pictures to retain audiences in periods during which they may dump network shows, but the answer to network movies is unlikely to be station movies in the long run. A better answer will probably be found in the nonmovie programing ventures that more and more stations, especially the station groups, are undertaking individually or cooperatively (see TELEVISION, December 1967).

Indeed the stimulation of nonnetwork program sources is essential for stations, not only for the short-range purpose of retaining negotiating strength in dealing with their networks but also for the long-range purpose of justifying their reason for existence. In a future that promises technological means of national television distribution by satellite or wire grid or both, the local station will survive only by proving it is making unique contributions in the six megacycles of spectrum space it occupies.